



# ***Daily Report***

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## **Sub-Saharan Africa**

FBIS-AFR-93-056  
Thursday  
25 March 1993

# Daily Report

## Sub-Saharan Africa

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25 March 1993

**NOTICE TO READERS:** An \* indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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### **Somali Reconciliation Conference Continues**

#### **Committee Agrees on National Council, Rotating Presidency**

*AB2403115793 Paris AFP in French 1039 GMT  
24 Mar 93*

[Text] Addis Ababa, 24 Mar (AFP)—The 15 Somali factions taking part in the national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa reached a consensus today on the principle for forming a national administrative council with a rotating presidency, it was learned from the Somali delegates.

This consensus was reached by the political committee of the Somali factions in charge of working out the mechanism for a transition in Somalia.

The same sources stated that the factions also agreed to divide Somalia into 18 administrative regions.

#### **Some Factions Reject Accord**

*AB2403203293 Paris AFP in English 2025 GMT  
24 Mar 93*

[Text] Addis Ababa, March 24 (AFP) - A conference of 15 rival Somali factions has been extended for one day, after some factions refused to sign an agreement reached Wednesday [24 March] on setting up a national administrative council.

The factions agreed in principle Wednesday morning to the setting up of a national council under rotating leadership, delegation sources in the Ethiopian capital said.

But by the afternoon, hours before a signing ceremony was due to be held in the presence of Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi, several faction heads had refused to sign the accord, Somali delegation sources said.

They were demanding more time to study the document before they agreed to sign it, the sources said, saying the conference, which began 10 days ago, would continue for an extra day Thursday.

Under the accord reached in the morning, the factions agreed on dividing the country into 18 regions, although many specific details remained to be worked out, the sources said.

There was disagreement over which factions would be eligible for the rotating presidency, they said.

The proposal for a national council in parallel with regional administrations combined conflicting views on what transitional arrangements to put in place for the war-torn country. Eleven of the factions wanted a proper central government.

But that was opposed as premature in current conditions by leading warlord General Mohamed Farah Aidid, who heads the four-group Somali National Alliance.

He argued that only regional administrations could be envisaged for the moment.

Informed sources said that after 10 days of reconciliation talks, the consensus emerged following a meeting on Tuesday between faction chiefs and Ethiopian leader Zenawi, who put his authority on the line to persuade them of the need to reach agreement.

Despite the cancellation of the signing ceremony, the Ethiopian president was due to receive the 15 faction heads at a presidential dinner Wednesday evening, diplomatic sources said.

### **Kagera Basin Organization Summit Opens 21 Mar**

*EA2103182093 Bujumbura Radio-Television Nationale  
du Burundi Radio in French 1100 GMT 21 Mar 93*

[Excerpt] The first ordinary summit of heads of state of the Kagera Basin Organization [KBO] opened in Bujumbura this morning. Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda, and Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania were received this morning by their Burundian counterpart Pierre Buyoya in order to ratify the decisions taken by the KBO Council of Ministers' proceedings. During the conference's opening ceremony, the Burundian head of state expressed the wish for a fresh start for the KBO and for peace in the sub-region. Here is President Pierre Buyoya:

[Begin Buyoya recording] I hope that during the mandate which has just started the organization will work increasingly well and that this will be facilitated by better conditions. I consider the most important of these conditions to be peace and stability in our region. In this regard I strongly wish for the efforts to restore peace in Rwanda to be fruitful and that all the goodwill will lead, through peaceful means, to the rapid signing of a peace agreement that will be respected by all. [passage omitted] [end recording]

### **Conference Ends; Communique Issued**

*EA2203190993 Bujumbura Radio-Television Nationale  
du Burundi Radio in French 1100 GMT 22 Mar 93*

[Excerpt] The first ordinary summit of the Kagera Basin Organization [KBO] ended in Bujumbura on 21 March. The KBO, which comprises Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, adopted all the proposals on its agenda, notably the restructuring of the organization's executive secretariat and the three important KBO projects: the Tanzanian and Ugandan road projects, the construction of the Hep station in Rusumo, Rwanda, and the control and eradication of the tsetse fly and tripanosomiasis. Here is an excerpt from the summit's final communique, which was attended by president of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya; Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, and Tanzanian president Ali Hassan Mwinyi. The communique was

read by the organization's executive secretary, Jean-Bosco Balinda from Rwanda. He tells Jean-Jacques Ntamagara about the organization's finances:

[Balinda] To mobilize the resources needed for the implementation of the program, it was decided to organize a round table of creditors during June and July. Burundi and Tanzania were designated to brief donors in April. At the same time, the Council of Ministers and the Executive Secretariat were instructed to contact diplomatic missions in the four capitals with a view to preparing the briefing mission and guaranteeing the success of donors meeting. Finally, it was decided that during the round table, Uganda will present the road projects, Rwanda the Rusumo Falls project, and Tanzania the project of eradicating the tsetse fly and tripanosomiasis.

The conference reaffirmed the commitment of member countries to the KBO's aims and to paying all contribution arrears to its budget. The conference took note of the payment of 100,000 U.S. dollars by Tanzania and Uganda's undertaking to pay the KBO as soon as possible 300,000 U.S. dollars to cover part of the outstanding arrears owed to the KBO's budget for the 1993 period. While hailing the efforts of the two countries, the participants called on them to ensure that the remaining arrears were paid as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

#### **SADC Council Chairman To Brief Heads of State**

*MB2503100393 Gaborone Radio Botswana Network in English 1110 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] The vice president and minister of finance and development planning, Mr. Festus Mogae, left Gaborone today for a two-day official visit to three African countries. A news release from the SADC [Southern African Development Community] Headquarters in Gaborone says Mr. Mogae is to brief heads of state of Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda on progress made in the implementation of decisions taken by the chairman of SADC and the Preferential Trade Area [PTA] Authority at their February meeting in Gaborone about relations between the two organizations.

During that meeting the chairman of SADC, the president, Sir Ketumile Masire, and the PTA chairman, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, agreed on a joint committee of ministers to examine issues of harmonization, coordination and rationalization of the activities of SADC and the PTA. The committee is to be made up of three ministers from each of the organizations, and is to be under the chairmanship of an eminent person acceptable to both sides. Mr. Mogae, who is the chairman of the SADC Council of Ministers, is accompanied by the SADC executive secretary, Dr. Simba Makoni, and senior government and SADC Secretariat officials.

## Central African Republic

### Prime Minister Views Electoral Delays

AB2403162793 Bangui Radiodiffusion-Television  
Centrafricaine Radio in French 1800 GMT 22 Mar 93

[Text] Prime Minister Enoch Derant-Lakoue, in a national radio broadcast this afternoon, made a general policy statement to the Central African people. The head of government first made it a point to shed some light on the deceitful campaign against his current political activities. He also recalled the faltering setbacks in the transition, which has been underway since 21 November last year, namely: the formation of a government in December 1992, which could not resist the pitfalls of cohabitation; the crisis resulting from the lack of understanding between the head of state and the former head of government which brought the electoral process to a halt and led to the nonobservance of the electoral deadlines of 14 and 28 February; and finally, the dissolution of the first transition government.

The prime minister clearly spelled out 10 priorities for the transition period he has been asked to head. These were: preparing and organizing free and open elections; creating the conditions for voters to vote judiciously by freeing and revitalizing the state media; ensuring the security of the people; reassuring the people through an efficient legal system; combating fraud; guaranteeing and improving the income of farmers and livestock breeders; meeting the financial commitments of the state to its workers, students, and suppliers; supporting and relaunching political activities; supporting the activities of the education and culture sectors; and finally, restoring the prestigious image of Central African Republic.

[London BBC World Service in English at 0630 GMT on 24 March adds the following: "The new prime minister in the Central African Republic, Enoch Derant-Lakoue, has announced more delays in the planned presidential and legislative elections. In his first speech to the nation since his appointment by President Andre Kolingba last month, Mr. Derant-Lakoue said the elections could not be called in the near future, and he blamed the Electoral Commission for not completing the necessary preparations. Mr. Derant-Lakoue, who is a member of the Social Democratic Party and a candidate for the presidency, also said that it was time the law is enforced allowing opposition parties access to the media."]

## Chad

### National Conference Extends Until 6 Apr

AB2403135293 Ndjamena Radiodiffusion Nationale  
Tchadienne in French 1900 GMT 22 Mar 93

[Excerpt] Today, delegates at the Sovereign National Conference were unable to start examining some resolutions and reports from the various committees because

they were not yet prepared. The chairman of the Presidium had announced this morning, however, that three of the committees were ready and that all that remained was to distribute the documents to the delegates—but this was not the case. When proceedings resumed this afternoon, the Presidium chairman informed delegates that the reports will only be ready on 23 March, provided it is not another public holiday.

The Presidium nonetheless informed delegates of the latest measures taken. Thus, the Conference will end on 6 April instead of 25 March as planned. Delegates therefore have 14 days to adopt the final texts and put in place the transition organs. The conference hours have also been changed: On Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, delegates will work from 0900 to 1300 [0800 to 1200 GMT] in the mornings, and from 1400 to 1800 in the afternoons. There will also be night sessions from 1830 to 2030. [passage omitted]

## Congo

### General Election Scheduled for May

AB2503103393 Paris AFP in English 0331 GMT  
25 Mar 93

[Text] Brazzaville, March 24 (AFP)—Congo's second general election in under a year is to be held in May, government spokesman Kamara Mamadou Dekamo said.

The early poll follows a decision by President Pascal Lissouba to dissolve the new multi-party parliament elected only last July.

He moved against the 125-member national assembly in November when it passed a no confidence motion against the government of then prime minister Stephan Maurice Bongo-Nouara.

## Rwanda

### President Reacts to Report on Human Rights Violations

EA2403191493 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale de la  
Republique Rwandaise in French 1800 GMT 23 Mar 93

[Excerpts] Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, the president of the Republic, has reacted to the report of the international commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Rwanda since 1 October 1990—the date on which the war started in our country. [passage omitted]

Regarding the international inquiry, the head of state regretted that the commission had confined itself to isolated political-ethnic cases, basing itself on the party-to-party confrontation now prevailing in our country [sentence as heard]. President Habyarimana said a well-conducted inquiry should have been suspicious of this disconcerting confrontation which produced one-sided testimonies, political-ethnic [words indistinct], which caused confusion rather than clarifying matters.

He also regretted that, in spite of the published reports, the scale of the atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] against civilians had not drawn the attention of the international investigators. The head of state said the commission should have also considered the political turmoil as another important factor in the current situation.

The conclusions reached by the commission are [word indistinct], the Rwandan head of state added. He also launched an appeal to the peace-loving national and international opinion to show caution in interpreting the report. [passage omitted]

#### Further on Future Structure of National Army

EA2403195093 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise in French 0430 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Excerpts] Talks are continuing in Arusha, Tanzania. The two delegations, which on 23 March managed to agree on the structure of the national army to be comprised of—as I recall—elements of the present Rwandan and Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] forces, will discuss from today the quota to be allotted to each side. Balthazar Nduwayezu is on the line from Arusha:

[Nduwayezu] The two sides have completed talks on the structure and organization of the army. The future army will be under the government's authority. On the organizational level, the army has above it an army staff with its own headquarters. The army is divided into four brigades of two or three battalions each. Support units under the authority of the army staff will also be operating: a military police company and the (Rugugwe) commando training center. [passage omitted]

The presidential guard battalion will be abolished. A republican guard, in charge of the security of senior officials including the president of the Republic, the prime minister and government members, will be set up within the gendarmerie. [passage omitted]

The two sides will start negotiating on the practicalities of the integration of the two forces tomorrow, but already the issue of languages to be used by the new army has been touched on. It has been noted that the Rwandan Army uses French and Kinyarwanda while the RPF uses Swahili, English, and Kinyarwanda. It has been decided that a general mechanism for linguistic integration for refugees would be set up to help them quickly learn the official languages, Kinyarwanda and French, and that the mechanism would also cover the army apparatus.

Measures will be taken to facilitate communications inside the army before the completion of this linguistic integration.

#### RPF Comments on Socialist Defeat in France

EA2303114393 (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura in Kinyarwanda to Rwanda 1715 GMT 22 Mar 93

[Excerpts] The ruling party in France has been defeated. [passage omitted] Foreign radios say that the defeat was due to the mismanagement of the country's resources, financial scandals, high unemployment, and bad foreign policy. The next government, therefore, will have to solve these problems. The Socialist government was more concerned with foreign policy than domestic policy.

This is true because there is no continent in which France does not have troops. It supports dictatorship and misuses French funds. That is why, therefore, its citizens decided to (?remove it from power). One of the problems which caused its removal is the support of foreign dictators, including our country of Rwanda.

Foreign radios also say that the elections will have consequences for Rwanda. The troops who were brought in under the pretext of protecting the French will have to return home as French people will not continue to pour funds into a country where they have no interests. [Word indistinct] as they were protected by the lion [French President] Mitterrand should know that things have changed. [passage omitted]

#### Zaire

##### 'All Political Trends' To Gain Access to Media

EA2403142193 Kinshasa Voix du Zaire in French 0500 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Excerpts] The man in charge of the formation of the broad-based national union and public salvation government, His Excellency [Prime Minister] Mr Faustin Birindwa, continued his consultations between 0900 and 1900 on 23 March. [passage omitted]

It is also worth reporting that the chairman and managing director of the Zairian Radio and TV Office [OZRT] has been ordered to facilitate access to the state-owned media by all political trends of the national life without discrimination. The OZRT chairman and managing director was also asked to submit a report to the prime minister on news coverage equipment and other logistics OZRT requires. [passage omitted]



### De Klerk Discloses Nuclear Capability to Parliament

MB2403161093 Johannesburg Radio South Africa  
Network in English 1448 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Address by President F.W. de Klerk to a special joint session of Parliament in Cape Town; italicized passages in Afrikaans—live; broadcast in progress]

[Text] ... Non-Proliferation Treaty and related matters. Since then certain developments have compelled me to cover a wider area. I am, however, still commencing with announcements relating to South Africa's nuclear capability. Honorable members will recall that when I delivered my first opening address on 2 February 1990 I emphasized, among other things, the normalization of South Africa's international relations. An important aspect of this was, and is, the significant contribution that South Africa can and will have to make toward peace, stability and progress in southern Africa. With this objective in mind the government has, in addition to many other initiatives in a variety of other spheres, taken far-reaching and drastic decisions with regard to the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. This includes nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons.

The government acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, on 10 July 1991. We became a founder signatory of the United Nations Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and on their destruction on 14 January 1993. It is also participating in the current review of the Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons.

I wish to concentrate today on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and would like to convey important information to Parliament, the public and the international community. It is important that the integrity of the Republic of South Africa with regard to its commitments to nuclear non-proliferation should be placed above any doubt.

When a country accedes to the NPT it undertakes, as from the date of accession, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. It also undertakes to enter into a safeguards agreement in terms of which a comprehensive inventory of all the nuclear material and nuclear facilities as they exist for the country as a whole at the time that agreement enters into force, be submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Such facilities and material are then subject to international inspection and verification. The IAEA also conducts regular inspections to verify the inventory and to ensure that these materials and facilities are used for peaceful purposes only.

Since its accession to the NPT, South Africa has strictly adhered to the conditions of the NPT and has maintained a policy of transparency and professional cooperation with the IAEA. This positive approach has led to

South Africa's resuming its seat at the IAEA general assembly since September 1991, without opposition, after an absence of 12 years. The process of verifying the completeness of South Africa's declaration of nuclear materials and facilities has proceeded so successfully that the IAEA was in the position to report to the Board of Governors in September 1992, after a large number of IAEA inspections, that nothing had been found to suggest that South Africa's inventory of nuclear materials and facilities was not complete, nor was there anything to suggest that the list of facilities and materials submitted for control were incomplete.

However, mainly because of the events in Iraq, which violated the conditions of the NPT by launching a clandestine nuclear weapons program, certain countries have called the effectiveness of the IAEA Verification Regime into question. Some countries have also alleged that South Africa still has covert aspirations in this regard, and that it has not fully disclosed its stockpile of enriched uranium. Such allegations are regularly taken up by both the local and the international press, and are beginning to take on the dimensions of a campaign.

South Africa's present nuclear program which is directed towards commercialization, including the export of high-technology products, is in the process placed under suspicion and is harmed. Our country cannot afford this. Accordingly, I wish today to confirm unequivocally that South Africa is adhering strictly to the requirements of the NPT and that it will continue to do so. I would, however, like to go further. Any doubt about the government's intention with regard to nuclear matters must for once and for all be removed. For this reason the government has decided to provide full information on South Africa's past nuclear programs despite the fact that the NPT does not require this.

At one stage South Africa did indeed develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability. The decision to develop this limited capability was taken as early as 1974 against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat to southern Africa as well as prevailing uncertainty concerning the designs of the Warsaw Pact members. The buildup of the Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary as did South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance should it be attacked.

Details relating to the limited deterrent capabilities and the strategy in this regard which were at the time developed, are as follows: The objective was the provision of seven nuclear fission devices which was considered the minimum for testing purposes and for the maintenance, thereafter, of a credible deterrent capability. When the decision was taken to terminate the program only six devices had been completed. No advanced nuclear explosives, such as thermo-nuclear explosives, were manufactured. The program was under the direct control of the head of government who decided that it should be managed and implemented by Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa].

Knowledge of the existence of the program was limited to a number of ministers on a need to know basis. The strategy was that if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be given to one or more of the major powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene. It was never the intention to use the devices and from the outset the emphasis was on deterrence. This was the situation when I became state president in 1989. As a former minister of the AEC [Atomic Energy Corporation] I was also informed about this. On my assumption of office as state president it was already evident to me and also to my colleagues who were also informed, that it was in our national interest that a total reverse, also in respect of our nuclear policy, was called for.

During 1989 the global political situation changed dramatically. A cease-fire in Angola was agreed. On the 22 September 1988, a tripartite agreement was signed at the United Nations, with Cuba and Angola, which provided for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. The cold war had come to an end and developments leading to the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Bloc had become the order of the day. The prospect of moving away from a confrontational relationship with the international community in general and with our neighbors in Africa, in particular, to one of cooperation and developments were good. In these circumstances a nuclear deterrent had become, not only superfluous but in fact an obstacle to the development of South Africa's international relations.

World opinion had also become increasingly opposed to nuclear weapons and significant advantages for South Africa could be forthcoming should it accede to the NPT. Although it already had an advanced nuclear technology base and nuclear industry, accession would facilitate the international exchanges of the new technology for its future development. It could also be of benefit to our neighboring states and in due course to Africa as a whole. Within this factual framework and with consideration to all of the other innovative policy objectives, which by then had already begun to take form, it was decided towards the end of 1989 that the pilot enrichment plant at Pelindaba should be closed and decommissioned.

Early in 1990, final effect was given to decisions that all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed. All the nuclear material in Armscor's possession should be recast and returned to the AEC where it should be stored according to internationally accepted measures. Armscor's facility should be decontaminated and be used only for non-nuclear commercial purposes, after which South Africa should accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby submitting all its nuclear materials and facilities to internal safeguards.

The implementation of these decisions and instructions proceeded according to plan. The process of dismantling took place under the strict joint control of the AEC and Armscor. As a further control measure, an eminent professor of nuclear physics, Professor W.L. Mouton, was appointed as independent auditor to oversee the process and to report directly to me. It was his task to satisfy himself that every gram of nuclear material had been accounted for, and that all the hardware and design information was destroyed. This has been done. South Africa acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty on the 10th of July 1991, and signed, according to the requirements of the treaty, a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on the 16th of September 1991 with immediate force and effect. On the 30th of October 1991, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, South Africa submitted a complete inventory of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction, which contains such materials on the 30th of September 1991, since which date all such materials and facilities are subject to international safeguards.

South Africa's hands are clean and we are concealing nothing. Permission has now been granted by the government with a view to international inspection for full access to the facilities and the records of facilities which in the past were used for the preparation of a nuclear deterrent capability.

I sincerely trust, Mr. Speaker, that this unprecedented act, namely the voluntary dismantling of a nuclear deterrent capability, and the voluntary revelation of all relevant information, will confirm this government's effort to assure transparency. I trust also that South Africa's initiative will inspire other countries to take the same steps.

In conclusion Mr. Speaker, on this issue, I wish to emphasize that at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country, or cooperated with another country in this regard. Our expertise, technology and nuclear materials were fully protected and dealt with strictly according to international standards and agreements. South Africa has never conducted a clandestine nuclear test. There may be a perception that the decision to abandon the program means that the investment in the whole enterprise had been wasted. This is not the case. The enrichment technology developed by the AEC, as well as the nuclear materials which were produced, constitute an important asset for South Africa. They will contribute significantly to the ultimate success of the Atomic Energy Corporation's peaceful commercialization program.

The operation of the Pilot Enrichment Plant allowed South Africa to continue operation of the AEC's research reactor, which is also used for the production of radioactive isotopes for medical purposes, during a period when the international community refused to provide nuclear fuel for its operation. The nuclear material that was used for the devices has been recovered and will be

used to enlarge the production of these and other isotopes. Safari 1 is amongst the very few reactors in the world which can meet this need.

Furthermore, the application of the enrichment technology to the establishment of the semi-commercial enrichment plant provided South Africa with the ability to provide all the nuclear fuel requirements of the Koeberg Nuclear power station and to guarantee this supply at a time when the delivery of nuclear fuel for Koeberg from overseas was denied. In addition to this, South Africa's accession to the NPT has already led to the lifting of nuclear sanctions by the United States of America. Exchanges of visits with states in Africa have also taken place with a view to agreements on the use of medical isotopes and training programs. We have become a member of the Africa Regional Cooperative Agreement, ARCA, an organization within the IAEA, which coordinates peaceful nuclear projects and cooperation between African states in the nuclear field. The prospects for further cooperation will be enhanced by the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa. The government has already publicly committed itself to this and believes that it can make a significant contribution to the establishment of peace and security in southern Africa.

South Africa will soon be taking an active part in the transcontinental discussions on this all important issue. We will be supported by the fact that South Africa acquired a nuclear capability and in recognition of its new relationship with Africa and the broader international community, abandoned it. Without accession to the NPT none of this would have been possible. I trust that the book on this chapter of the past can now be closed and that a new one of international cooperation and trust can now be opened.

*Mr. Speaker, in this regard, before I discuss violence and negotiation, I want to deviate from my prepared speech in the light of the reaction from the benches of the Conservative Party. Sir, from their tone and interjections I deduce that they would like South Africa to still have an atom bomb at its disposal, and Sir, it is their approach that if they were ever ... if they were ever in power, then they would use such a bomb against other people ...*

*[Speaker, interrupting] Order, the honorable Mr. Hercules ...*

*[De Klerk continues] Sir, if there was ever a reason for this country to finally lose all trust in that party then it is because of their attitude today on this issue. [shouting from floor]*

*[Speaker, interrupting] Order ... order ... order ...*

*[De Klerk continues] Sir, I want to address violence and negotiations. While the future of our country's international relations seems to be rosy, the same cannot be said about the internal situation. I do not want to imply that*

*there has not been several positive and encouraging developments taking place in South Africa. We have a lot to be thankful for.*

*Unfortunately, these positive factors, which include the resumption of multiparty negotiations, because it is very positive, is being dominated by a continuing wave of crime and violence. This was worsened by the recent series of revolting and senseless murders of children and travelers, especially in Natal and Transvaal. Rightly so, this has unleashed a feeling of deep resentment, shock and anger among most South Africans. The same goes for the international community.*

*Mr. Speaker, without ignoring the seriousness and tragic consequences of all other killings through political violence, we call to memory the following: The tragic death of six schoolchildren and the wounding of a seventh in the Table Mountain area near Pietermaritzburg at the beginning of March 1993, where innocent children were ambushed and murdered on their way to school; the similar cold-blooded attack on 19 March 1993 at Eikenhof near Johannesburg, during which two children and their mother were shot dead; the so-called retaliatory attacks, in which a child in Nigel was cold-bloodedly wounded and in which a black man died in a similar incident. Add to this several other incidents, including the incident in which 10 children were also shot dead in an attack on a minibus taxi in the Table Mountain area in Natal and the attack on a bus on the way to Pietermaritzburg in which four children were killed—then the extent and the seriousness of the situation will become still clearer. Our deepest sympathy and compassion goes out to the families of all those who died in violence and, in particular, to the families of the innocent children who were so brutally murdered. There is no excuse in this world that can be given for these murders. It is barbaric and totally unacceptable in civilized society.*

*An analysis of these incidents, Mr. Speaker, brings two other aspects to the fore. Firstly, it emphasizes the potential polarization between the various population groups in our country. Secondly, circumstances indicate that several militant organizations are most probably responsible for this. In truth, APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] stands out as a result of reported acceptance of responsibility for a whole series of terrorist attacks and as a result of the arrogant way in which it continues to promote political violence. The fact is, however, that some of these children were also murdered by members of other militant political organizations.*

*Another aspect that comes to the fore is that certain political spokesmen and commentators are accusing the government of having a double agenda and that the government reacts quicker in cases of murders of white people and children, compared to their reaction to the murders of children of black people. I reject this insinuation and accusation. The police act in every case, using the same criteria, determining what action to take. In the case of murders of black children in Natal, the police acted*



*effectively and strongly and they were successful in apprehending the murderers. The deployment of security forces to counter political violence and the emphasis on protection and security in areas mainly inhabited by black South Africans, indicate the falseness of this insinuation. Allegations of this nature, sir, is fuel for all those who want to heighten racial tension, and it is used by radicals and those advocating violence. We must guard against a new spiral of violence at all costs—against the belief that violence can be countered by further violence.*

*Mr. Speaker, after saying this, I want to emphasize that the public statements of the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], and its military wing, APLA, truly demand special attention. The PAC cannot disregard its direct link between itself and APLA. Its own declarations regarding the matter is proof of this link. All information at the government's disposal shows a direct relationship between the leadership of the PAC and APLA, and we hold the PAC responsible for all the activities of APLA. PAC's refusal to distance itself from APLA statements and actions, and its dualistic approach to a peaceful process, and also its refusal to sign the Peace Accord, creates a serious obstacle in the multiparty negotiations process. The same applies to other participants who have not signed the Peace Accord. It is therefore, the government's opinion that it has now become necessary for multiparty negotiations to focus on ending the violence. All participants must be bound and committed to the peace process. Military wings, private armies, and militant sub-organizations must be effectively and visibly bound to ending all illegal activities. The government is not planning to disrupt the negotiations process, but will insist that these matters be solved peacefully. No party can faithfully be part of peaceful negotiations, while organizations under its control continue with violent activities and contravening the law with its silent approval.*

*Mr. Speaker, current circumstances, also demand that steps be taken in other areas, and not only in the area of negotiations. The most important being the intensifying of police and security force actions. From my announcements during the opening of Parliament, quite a few measures in this matter are already in operation, and are contained in a 10-point plan, which the South African Police will make known within a few days.*

*In addition, I want to announce that during the past 24 hours, 18 identified members of APLA were arrested, and are being held for questioning. More arrests are to follow. I also want to announce that, [disruptions from the floor], Mr. Speaker, I also want to announce that the government has decided on a comprehensive action plan for the stabilization of all areas in the country which are identified as problem areas. Because a surprise element is important, if one wants to obtain success, full details cannot be made known. The implementation of this plan will demand that security forces drastically increase their manpower efforts for a time. Consequently, the defense force will be able to send urgent messages over a fairly wide region.*

*Sir, with these envisaged security actions, the government also considers the application of punishment in the struggle against violence and crime. In this regard, the death penalty is an important subject. I have already indicated at the opening of Parliament on 29 January 1993, that the government is in the process of reevaluating its position on the death penalty. The government is convinced that the present policy to retain the death penalty is both morally and legally correct, and gives an honest view of the state's duty to protect the interest of its citizens. The government also believes that these preventative mechanisms should be included in a charter of fundamental rights. The death penalty in line with constitutional policy, as proposed by the South African Law Commission, is a legitimate option, and should be considered.*

*Sir, In light of the progress made with regard to the acceptance of a charter of fundamental rights, the government found it necessary and fair to suspend the execution of the death penalty for a reasonable period, pending the outcome of the negotiations process over a transition charter of fundamental rights, which will apply during this phase. During the opening of Parliament on 29 January 1993, I indicated that the wave of brutal murders and killings, the prevailing disrespect for human lives, the delays in the negotiations process, makes it very difficult for the government to let this moratorium continue indefinitely. That is why it was announced that the government is reconsidering its position on the execution of the death penalty, and will consult with Parliament on this matter. Mr. Speaker, the government has decided to approach Parliament at the first possible opportunity, during a motion in Parliament, to give an opportunity to all members to vote on this matter during a debate. At the same time, In my capacity as leader of the National Party, I would like to announce that all members of the National Party will be allowed to vote on such a matter freely, according to each person's individual conviction.*

*At the same time the government will launch an intensive process of consultation with leaders of extra-Parliamentary parties and organizations. In conclusion, sir, I want to get back to the issue of APLA. Today a report was released by the Commission of Inquiry Into the Causes and Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, better known as the Goldstone Commission—released by a committee appointed by the commission, who conducted a preliminary investigation into the activities of APLA. I do not want to go into the details of the report. In general, the government accepts the recommendations in the report.*

*Concerning the Transkei, the committee has made the following preliminary findings, and I quote: APLA is using Transkei as a springboard for attacks into the Republic of South Africa. Weapons and ammunition are being hidden in Transkei for use by APLA units. The presence of APLA members in the Transkei is known to members of the Transkei Police. The Transkeian government has supplied weapons to APLA, allegedly for VIP protection programs. APLA members are being trained in*

*Transkei. Weapons and explosives are being smuggled into the Republic of South Africa and Transkei, for use by APLA members. APLA's internal high command for the Republic is based in Transkei. Sir, as the honorable members know, the Goldstone Commission committee has repeatedly extended public invitations to all parties to submit important information. In the light of serious allegations, concerning the involvement of, among others, official Transkeian institutions, with regard to APLA activities, the committee chairman specifically directed a request to the Transkei government to participate in its activities. The Transkei government, after several requests, neglected to take part.*

*Mr. Speaker, the preliminary findings of this committee, indicating active participation by official Transkeian institutions in APLA activities in South Africa, is cause for serious concern. The government of the Republic of South Africa views this in an extremely serious light. It has been decided to urgently request the Transkei government's reaction to the report, as proposed by the commission. It must be emphasized that it is not just the South African Government which desires reaction from the Transkei government, but the commission itself. Action taken by the government will depend on the reaction from the Transkei government.*

*Sir, in conclusion I want to ask that we, the highest council in the country, stand back a while and review at the situation in the country. Everything, sir ... everything is positive ... organized, poised for progress—for a breakthrough to a negotiated new dispensation in South Africa. Multiparty negotiations, sir, on an extended basis have been resumed. Under the most important economic circumstances a budget has been tabled which has instilled confidence in investors. Sir, we have had good rains and agriculture stands on the threshold of yielding a better harvest compared to many years. Sir, there are many positive things which can lead to peace and prosperity for all if we act responsibly now. But sir, there is one thing standing between us and that breakthrough// and that Mr. Speaker, is the continued political violence, and it has become time that this must become the priority of each and every political leader. Sir, instead of some political parties—already structuring their own mobilization—thus contributing to the tension in our country, all political leaders, sir, should now come forth and identify this as the highest priority and stand together in bringing political violence to an end. Sir, if we do that there will remain a small lunatic fringe to the left and to the right who will try to continue with this, but all South Africans, sir, can and should be unified into one mighty (?wave), one strong unbreakable wall against the threat of violence. Sir, it is within our grasp, and I call from this podium to all South African leaders to accept the responsibility. Sir, the government will do its full share in bringing political violence to an end now. I thank you sir.*

### **De Klerk Holds News Conference on Speech**

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[News conference by President F.W. de Klerk at the H.F. Verwoerd Building with foreign and domestic reporters in Cape Town—live]

[Text] [Casper Venter, media secretary of the State President's Office] Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for turning up in such large numbers. The press conference will be started by Mr. de Klerk making a few introductory remarks. Then you will have a little bit of time for questions but, since we are linked to Johannesburg, we will be crossing over for questions from Johannesburg as well. Thank you very much.

[De Klerk] Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I am not going to make introductory remarks on the first part of my speech and will accept questions in that regard. May I just introduce to you, on my left, Dr. Stumpf, who is the chief executive of the Atomic Energy Corporation and, on his left, Mr. Tielman de Waal, who heads Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], the new Armscor, which has been separated from the manufacturing side and the industrial side of the armament industry in South Africa. That now falls under another company altogether. And then, Minister Pik Botha, whom you know very well. Now, ladies and gentlemen, in the second part of my speech which, has not been translated simultaneously and we are now distributing a number of available copies of the second part in English as well, I focused on violence and the negotiation situation and made a number of important points: Firstly, that the insinuation that the South Africa Police deals with double standards when it comes to following up criminal investigations of murders upon whites on the one hand and blacks on the other hand, this was strongly rejected, and I explained that the very same standards and the very same methods are applied in all cases. Secondly, I emphasized that the present spate of violence and the turn that it has taken obviously will have an impact on the negotiation situation.

We do not intend, as the government, in any way to disrupt negotiations but feel very strongly that in a multiparty negotiation situation, the emphasis should shift and it should shift now as top priority to bring violence to an end and to ensure that all parties are bound and become fully bound by the peace accord, that all parties, with their military wings, with their private armies, with their militant suborganizations, should be brought to the situation where they officially and actually stand away from violence and this must be achieved also in the multiparty negotiation process.

I furthermore announced that the police have refined and drawn up a 10-point plan which will be made available to the public and explained at a press conference within a number of days, but that the government has decided upon an action plan to stabilize all the areas which can be identified as a problem and that this will

involve a relatively dramatic increase for a period of manpower levels and that this will result in the South African Defense Force calling up, on a fairly broad basis, people who have to do service when they are called up. Furthermore, I referred to the death sentence and explained the government's position once again, namely that we believe it should also be part of the negotiations affecting the Bill of Rights, but that, in the light of the absolutely gruesome murders and the spate of violent deaths that we are experiencing, the government finds it extremely difficult to stand by its moratorium and is considering its position.

As promised in my opening address, I announced that Parliament will as soon as possible be asked for its advice by way of a motion where everybody will be able to vote and that my party, the National Party, will be allowed a free vote, each individual according to his or her own conscience. I then also referred to the Goldstone Commission's report on APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] and in general indicated that we accept the recommendations and then, in specific reference, after having quoted a number of quotations from the report, said that we regard the position of Transkei in a very serious light, as it emerges from the report, where it has been indicated that official instances and structures within the Transkei have been involved, are involved, or might definitely be involved in assistance, in some form or another, to APLA and that Transkei has been used and is being used as a base for APLA. I indicated that the government will be asking of the Transkei to respond to the report and that its actions will depend upon the response which comes from the Transkei government.

[Venter] Mr. Breytenbach?

[Breytenbach] Mr. President, would you tell us why you decided to make this announcement right now? Were you aware that there was going to be publication in the United States, speculation about the South African (?capacity)? And if I could then just add to that, the six devices that existed, would they have worked if the trigger had been pulled?

[De Klerk] I will ask Dr. Stumpf to reply with regard to the second part which is more technical. With regard to the first part of your question, yes, to a certain extent the fact, and I have referred to it in my speech, that apparently enough has leaked so that we were starting to get press inquiries from quite a number of sources—the decision to make it public was taken well in advance of the report which was published in THE WASHINGTON POST which coincided with the minister of foreign affairs's visit there. So it was not that publication which prompted us. The decision had already been taken by then, and the specific date was because I would have liked the minister to be back in South Africa when the announcement is made. Can I just furthermore say that also, there has been the criticism from countries and important commentators that disbelieve, and because of the disbelief there was a threat to the commercialization

program from which South African can benefit greatly and it has become necessary to dispel these doubts, so that with full trust restored, South Africa's people can benefit from the technological development which has taken place in this process, and from also exports which can come about as a result of our accession to the NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty]. Well, the minister would just like to add something, and then Dr. Stumpf can just answer the second part.

[Botha] Just to supplement the president's response, there was a suspicion that South Africa might have transferred technology to irresponsible governments elsewhere in the world, or that South Africa might even have sold some of the devices to such governments, or transferred highly enriched uranium; and suggestions were even made and allegations were made that we did so also after signing the NPT, and that we did not completely disclose to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] all the quantities of highly enriched uranium. So there was only one way really in effect to handle this matter, to manage this matter, and that was to come clean. And as the president indicated, to have eventually an auditor who could say that every gram, not every kilogram, but every gram of material could be accounted for.

[Venter] Dr. Stumpf?

[Stumpf] The Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC] was not involved in building the devices, it was actually Armscor, but I would like to say that there is was reason to believe they would not have worked, although it was never part of the strategy to test them and use them.

[Venter] The gentleman in front please?

[Unidentified reporter] President de Klerk, you mention the Goldstone report which said that PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] President Clarence Makwetu served on APLA's high command, and his deputy, Johnson Mlambo, was commander-in-chief. When you talked about the 18 arrests, are any of these two gentlemen—have they been taken in for questioning, or is any action planned against them?

[De Klerk] I haven't received a list of the arrests which have been made—the names as yet—so I couldn't give you any details on that. But according to my information, it was people who have their main base in APLA which have been arrested.

[Venter] [words indistinct] center please?

[Unidentified reporter] I just wanted to find out how many troops are going to be involved in this increased program of yours, and whether this dismantling of the nuclear capability has anything to do with keeping it out of the hands of a future government? And finally, what is your personal position on the death penalty?

[De Klerk] On the first question—eh, just refresh my memory please?



[Reporter] How many troops are going to be involved?

[De Klerk] I can't give you an exact number, but as I have indicated, a fairly dramatic increase in manpower is required because we want to cover all the problem areas. That means a fairly dramatic call-up, but in the final analysis, the exact number can only be established after we know who gets exemption because of particular problems, and it is also part of the plan that we do not disclose all the details because then everybody focuses on that instead of focusing on the constructive purpose of this action. The action is aimed at stabilizing all problem areas. With regard to the second question—just refer back to that again?

[Reporter] The dismantling of the nuclear capabilities, was it to keep it out of the hands of a future...

[De Klerk, interrupting] Oh, yes. Can I just in that regard say to the best of my knowledge, all the important parties that one can expect to form part of a government of national unity, as far as I know, all the leaders are fully supporting of the fact that we signed the NPT, and I have no reason to believe that—with the exception of one or two radical parties—that there are any political leaders who will not be supportive of the fact that we do not have it, and that we signed the NPT. So there is no question of that. There are people who allege this, but they must stand (?father) for that thought, it is not our approach at all. Then on the third question, my personal position on the death sentence has always been that I basically believe that the death sentence should be part of our legal system. I was very much in favor of the reforms which we brought about, and the new system where the death sentence is no longer compulsory unless there are mitigating circumstances. But where the death sentence is only prescribed in cases where there are actually aggravating circumstances has my full support. It was a good reform. But I think in a limited sense the death sentence should be part of the whole system.

[Botha] May I then just add that our friends here might be interested that I have just received the reaction of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the president's statement, and the agency welcomed the public disclosure of this part of South Africa's nuclear program, and took note of the declaration that the program was terminated prior to the signature of South Africa of the NPT in July 1991. So the first reaction was positive.

[Venter] Mr. John MacLennan?

[MacLennan] Mr. President, when the ah—regarding nuclear weapons, when the cabinet ok'd the construction of nuclear weapons, I wonder if you could tell us—at that stage what did you see as the targets, and then more technically how would they be delivered and what were their capabilities?

[De Klerk] I wasn't in the cabinet when the decision was taken. As I have said, the decision was taken in 1974. I only entered the cabinet in 1978. To the best of my knowledge the cabinet, as a cabinet, never knew of it. It

was a decision taken by the head of government and knowledge of it was limited on a need-to-know basis. I only received information when I became the minister, I think in the early 80's, responsible also for the Atomic Energy Corporation. And I was only—then it was a fait accompli already, and it was already in the process of manufacture, and in the final analysis then I moved out of the stream again when I changed portfolios, and I only picked up the details again when I became head of government. So I don't think the cabinet ever knew, and only a limited number of ministers knew about it. I know for instance that the minister of foreign affairs, although he was appointed to the cabinet in 1977, also only became aware of it in '80 or '81 thereabouts. The second part of your question?

[MacLennan] More technically, what were the capabilities of these nuclear weapons and how would they have been delivered? For example, were they bombs or shells?

[De Klerk] I will ask Dr. Stumpf or Mr. Tielman de Waal to reply to that technical part.

[De Waal] The devices in the first instance, I think you must know, were designed to be a deterrent. Therefore, it was never the intention to use them. However, if you want to use them as a deterrent they must have a certain capability. They were designed in such a manner that they could be delivered by means of an aircraft. However, the first step would have been to do the underground test to demonstrate the capability of South Africa, and not to deliver them as a nuclear bomb.

[De Klerk] Can I in the meantime just welcome Mr. Coetsee also. I have asked him to join because of his involvement in the Department of Justice, and very shortly also in defense.

[Venter] Mr. Skovcraft, and then we will cross over to Johannesburg.

[Skovcraft] Mr. State President, Skovcraft of the L.A. TIMES. Specifically how big were the nuclear weapons? [Words indistinct] or what? That's the first part of my question, and the second part is, who did you consult with prior to making your decision to make it public?

[De Klerk] I'll reply to the second part and then Dr. Stumpf can reply to the first part. I firstly consulted with the ministers who knew about it, and with the top officials who knew about it. The decision was eventually mine and this morning I informed the cabinet of the existence in the past of those devices, of the decision in the past, in 1989, to dismantle them, of the completion of the dismantlement, and of my decision to now make it public.

[Venter] Dr. Stumpf?

[Stumpf] Under the NPT you actually undertake not to acquire or build or manufacture any weapons. And I think in (?principle) NPT has also implied that you don't transfer any technology. For information of that type to be released is not in the interest of nonproliferation, and won't be released.

[Venter] Now we are crossing...

[Unidentified reporter, interrupting] [Words indistinct]?

[De Klerk] In other words technical details will remain secret?

[Reporter, name indistinct] Even of the old program?

[De Klerk] Even of the old program.

[Venter] Now we are crossing...

[De Klerk, interrupting] But then I say it will be made available to the IE... eh [Someone in background says IEA] Agency. [laughter] There are four letters. It's the most difficult thing in English to say the IEAE. It's easier to say in Afrikaans. [laughter] Technical details will be made available to them. They have inspectors in the country at the moment. They will be inspecting now the premises which were used in building the devices and keeping them until they were destroyed and used in destroying them, so that now they have full access, also historically, to facilities which in terms of the NPT we needn't have given them access, and they should therefore easily now be in a position to fully satisfy themselves and the international community that there is nothing, nothing hidden or to hide.

[Botha] May I add also that we signed on 10 July 1991 the NPT, and then normally we would have had 18 months as from that date before a safeguards agreement had to be agreed upon. But we were in such a hurry that we already agreed to a safeguards agreement in September.

[De Klerk] Plus by then the process was—of dismantling—was completed already.

[Botha] We got rid of it.

[Venter] Right, now lets try Johannesburg. Johannesburg, can you hear us?

[Johannesburg] [Words indistinct]

[Venter] Do you have any questions from there?

[Johannesburg] Yes, we have at least five, thank you.

[Botha] Oh dear!

[Unidentified speaker] We'll only handle three.

[Venter] We'll allow you three to start with.

[Johannesburg] [Words indistinct]

[Venter] Kindly just tell us who is asking the question?

[Kathleen Barnes] I'm Kathleen Barnes from (?Australia). Mr. President, you said that parties involved in multiparty negotiations must be bound by the peace accord, particularly with reference to their military wings—their militants and their sub-organizations. Does this mean that if an organization such as the PAC, who

refuses to be bound to the peace accord ... that they will not be permitted to participate in such (?a conference)?

[De Klerk] It says ... what I meant is that this will now be our prime objective to attain this in the multiparty negotiation process. Many other parties have already indicated that the time for this has arrived and that parties who do not regard themselves bound, or who are not sufficiently committed to the peaceful process, that such parties become a stumbling block in the process and that something must be done about it. We intend, as a departure point, to do that in the multiparty negotiation process.

[Venter] Your second question please.

[SUNDAY STAR reporter David Brier] Good afternoon. David Brier from the SUNDAY STAR newspaper. I'd like to ask the state president this: For many years the government's standard response to any questions on our nuclear capability was that the government did not support the use of nuclear technology for military purposes, or that it did have the technical capabilities, so the question is: Why did the government consider it necessary to lie to the public for all these years?

[De Klerk] That reply which basically you are quoting correctly, to my mind is neither an admission nor a denial, and therefore, it wasn't a lie. The objective with that reply was to attain exactly the purpose of making people uncertain whether we had it or not. That, in itself, had a tremendous deterrent value ... was the evaluation ... and it is for that reason that, that reply was neither in the positive nor in the negative.

[Venter] The third question please.

[TORONTO STAR reporter Al Watson] Al Watson from the TORONTO STAR to the state president: Sir, given the fact that many of the gestures ... the violence that has taken place in recent days may be aimed at the (?late) election and the fact that—you've said it several times—that you don't think elections can be held under such conditions. Do you still stand by that position?

[De Klerk] Well I think there's been a lot of misinterpretation with regard to what I say in that regard. I don't think we should allow a small lunatic fringe to hold the country at ransom and to prevent either the negotiation process or the election, or the run-up to the election, not to proceed, but if the country is, generally speaking, in many vast areas in a state of violence and unrest, then it would be impossible to really succeed with free and fair elections. It is, therefore, a question of evaluation. I don't think that any country is ever fully free of violence, and I don't think that our country will be fully free of violence and intimidation. It is a question of attaining stability and bringing down the level of violence and intimidation to such an extent that one can truthfully say that the electoral process and the election itself, on election day, is actually free and fair. When that evaluation can be made, obviously the election process must go ahead.

[Venter] For the time being thank you Johannesburg, but stay tuned please. Back to Cape Town. Mr. Tim Cohen?

[Cohen] Mr. State President, you spent a lot of time discussing APLA's relationship with the Transkei government. Could you tell us, if the Transkei government decides not to react in any way, to your and the Goldstone Commission's request for action on APLA activity in the Transkei, which seems fairly ... it seems as though ... inevitably what will happen. What do you intend doing?

[De Klerk] Well let me firstly say I don't think I spent a lot of time ... I think it was about one and three-quarter minutes that I spent on it out of a speech of almost 40 minutes. I think that a negative reaction or a lack of reaction, or a refusal to really react will create a very negative situation and that the government, under such circumstances, will have to look very seriously at taking some or other form of firm steps to ensure that the interests of South Africa and all its people is served by what we decide. Therefore, I sincerely hope that the serious situation which is arising as a result of the preliminary findings of this committee, will be met with statesmanship and with responsibility from the Transkei. They must not underestimate the seriousness of the situation should they try to just play politics with this.

[Venter] Ms. [name indistinct]

[Reporter] Mr. President, International concern has also focused on your space program. The concern is obviously centered on whether the launch vehicles that would be used to deliver the satellites could also be used to deliver the nuclear warheads which you don't have. Is it also going to be your policy that that program should be wound up as well?

[De Klerk] No, we think that there is viability with regard to the satellite program for peaceful purposes, and we would like that program to go ahead, specifically focused on a satellite capability, there is interest in international circles, in participation, somehow or another, and it is possible that there might be positive developments, therefore in that regard. Theoretically I think that the missile aspect of what has taken part in the past, could have, if we had, or still had such a nuclear device, could have been connected to this. But we are now under safeguards. This country will never be able to get a nuclear device again, to build one again, because of the absolute network of inspection, and prevention, which being a member of the NPT casts on any country. That risk, therefore, has now fallen away totally, and we should be allowed to use the technology and technical expertise which we have. We have a problem, that we have highly trained people who can make a tremendous contribution, also in creating jobs in assuring that our country get its rightful place in the international community, also in the technical field, and it would be severe discrimination if any country or international agency, at

this stage tries to force us out of, on a competitive basis, playing an active role and developing our capabilities in this regard.

[Venter] Martin Shalane.

[Shalane] Mr. President, how much did the country spend on these nuclear devices, and what budget was it given all these units?

[De Klerk] Firstly to say what was exactly spent on the devices itself is difficult, because much of the cost went into the enrichment of the uranium. The enrichment of the uranium in itself is not, and was not only aimed at building these devices. When originally we started it was aimed at creating technology to enrich uranium without a decision to build these devices. Secondly, the costs, therefore appeared in various budgets, it would have been part of the old [Ucor] budget, it might have been part of the AEC, Dr. Stumpf can reply to that, other aspects, you would have found that expenses were made from the budget of Armscor, and therefore it wasn't under one specific head, as far as I know. With regard to the actual cost, I think the total cost, but that then includes the building of expertise, the inheritance which we now have, of being able to become a world player with regard to the manufacturing of isotopes for medical use. We have all that, we have the enriched uranium which can now be used, and which can create a fairly substantial income, much more than the actual work if we were to sell it as whole to, for instance, America. All the money has not been lost or wasted in any way whatsoever. The total amount involved might be in the vicinity of 700 to 800 hundred million rand, but that includes now the total project, as I say, and we retain many spinoffs in that regard.

[Venter] Ms. Temane.

[Temane] Mr. President do you expect, after the arrest of the 18 APLA members, and on the wave of the continuing violence, any negative influence on your negotiation process, number one; and number two, on the 18th of September 1978, there was, so far, an unexplained explosion in the southern Atlantic. So far it has been attributed to the South Africans, as being a nuclear test. Could that be fully explained now what it was?

[De Klerk] On the first part can I just say that I think we must expect the arrests to have an impact. I think that with some people it might be controversial. I think from many other participants in the multiparty negotiations it will be welcomed. Definitely from the PAC, I suppose, one can expect a very negative reaction. But the government has to do its duty, and when an organization starts claiming responsibility for deeds of terrorism and cold-blooded murder, then that government has to act, and we are acting as we've acted in the past. We have now taken additional steps to the steps which have been taken in the past. With regard to the second question, I have clearly stated that the government has not been involved in any testing of devices. That is true, it is also true of the incident that you refer to. My information is that even



the United States of America said that it might have been a nuclear event, but it might have also been something else like a small meteorite clashing with a satellite, and there is no certainty that it was a nuclear explosion. If it was, we were not involved.

[Venter] Mr. Peter Forbetius?

[Forbetius] Clarify something for me. When the inspections were carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency in '90—round about October '90?

[De Klerk] In '91.

[Forbetius] '91. Did you at that—were they that stage aware of the fact that we had a nuclear weapons capacity?

[De Klerk] No they were not aware and we were not, in terms of the NPT itself, obliged to tell them. The NPT only binds you from the date you sign it, to disclose a full inventory of all your enriched material, not to make any nuclear device, not to use your nuclear technology for any other purpose but peaceful purposes. And we have strictly adhered to that, and there was no duty upon us and no—when we signed it—no legal responsibility arose from that, that we should have disclosed it to them. So they were not aware, but I think from long before we signed it there has always been suspicion in many informed circles that we did have it, and in that sense of the word they might have been suspicious. But the inspections already proved that our hands were clean.

[Botha] May I add...

[De Klerk, interrupting] Can I just say, if a country is capable of building it, then that country can be expected to be clever enough not to make a fool of itself to try to bluff the international community when it signs the NPT.

[Botha] I believe we are the first country that had such a capability and voluntarily dismantled it. And in this sense, as the president indicated, we hope this will serve as an example to those countries who might also have such a capability, and simply to follow our example to take this decision voluntarily without having any obligation to do so, for the sake of making the earth and the world a safer place and avoid conflict in the future.

[Venter] We'll have a last...[live coverage cuts off at this point]

[Venter] Well, the press conference here in the Cape own has drawn to—is drawing to a close, and so before we return you to our normal programming, from Johannesburg I will highlight some of the issues that questioning in the press conference took further than President de Klerk in his answers here took in his speech to parliament a little earlier on. Well the (?high) interest clearly seemed to be on the remarkable statement made by President de Klerk that South Africa had had a nuclear deterrent capability. There he was asked why the South African Government had changed its strategy, and in

fact had dismantled that capability. President De Klerk answered there that in the new circumstances pertaining in the world, South Africa saw greater benefit in cooperating internationally, and in this respect he mentioned even the possibility of exports of nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes—those include medical and others.

He was then asked whether part of the strategy was to keep the nuclear capability out of the hands of an incoming government in South Africa. His reply there was that all parties, leaders of all responsible parties as far as he knew supported the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. President De Klerk was asked why the South African Government had lied to South Africa and the world, indeed, through all these years of possessing that capability. There he said that the government had neither confirmed nor denied that it had that deterrent capability—referring there to what is known in nuclear terms as the bomb-in-the-basement theory. Turning to domestic issues, the concentration there on violence, and the steps planned by the government to act against that violence, President de Klerk was asked of the numbers involved in the call-up, the national call-up that will be undertaken—he said he was not able to give numbers, but indicated that it would be extensive. He appealed for statesmanship from the transkei in cooperating with South Africa on the question of APLA bases and support from APLA there. And on the question of what his personal position was, on the death sentence, President de Klerk said that he personally believed that in aggravating circumstances the death sentence should apply. So from us in Cape Town we are now returning you to our programming in Johannesburg.

#### **Atomic Energy Head Comments on Nuclear 'Device'**

*MB2403214493 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2055 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] Pretoria March 24 SAPA—The nuclear weapon deterrent developed by South Africa between 1974 and 1980 reached only the stage of a nuclear "device" (toestel) and never a weapon, according to Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC] chief Dr Waldo Stumpf.

Explaining South Africa's nuclear deterrent strategy, which was for the first time officially admitted by President F W de Klerk in Parliament on Wednesday, Dr Stumpf said on SABC TV's Agenda programme South Africa never had a nuclear bomb as such.

He said the "device" could have been used in an underground "demonstration". It could also have been swiftly converted into a military weapon—possibly a bomb or a missile warhead.

Dr Stumpf declined to divulge technical details of the device except to say the government had authorised the manufacture of seven of them. Six had been completed when the order was given to abandon the project in 1990.



The AEC chief executive officer again denied that South Africa had been involved in a suspected nuclear test explosion in the south Atlantic Ocean in the late '70s.

The dismantling of South Africa's nuclear capability was completed within a year and by mid-1991 the blueprints as well as the hardware had been destroyed, Dr Stumpf said.

The enriched uranium used for the six "devices" was safely stored by the AEC and would possibly be used for medical purposes, he added.

An International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team visited South Africa's nuclear facilities after the nuclear "device" programme had been abandoned, but had been unaware of the programme, Dr Stumpf said.

It was reported on Wednesday that another IAEA inspection team would travel to South Africa soon to verify the scrapping of South Africa's nuclear military capability.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, who participated in the television programme from Cape Town, said that in the early '70s South Africa faced a conventional military threat from the Soviet Union and from Cuban military units in Angola.

"As the country was totally isolated at the time and could not obtain conventional weaponry from abroad, South Africa needed to develop a maximum deterrent," Mr Botha said, adding that it was always intended as a strategic deterrent.

#### **ANC Welcomes De Klerk Nuclear 'Admissions'**

MB2403175293 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1720  
GMT 24 Mar 93

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by African National Congress]

[Text] The ANC [African National Congress] welcomes the statement by President de Klerk to a joint session of Parliament on 24 March 1993, in which he finally confessed that South Africa has manufactured nuclear weapons, and in which he went on to claim that such weapons have been dismantled.

Although De Klerk claimed he was doing this voluntarily, it is clear that he was acting under the compulsion of international and domestic pressures. It is well known that the new Clinton administration has made demands for disclosure during the recent visit to the US of Foreign Minister Botha. The consistent pressure of the ANC's longstanding campaign against the apartheid nuclear programme has finally begun to bear fruit.

For many years the ANC has known that the apartheid regime possessed a nuclear capacity. This was reiterated at a conference held at Christmas 1992, when the ANC brought to light some of the details of South Africa's nuclear programme.

The ANC welcomed the government's compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), but was extremely concerned that under the NPT the government was not required to reveal its nuclear activities prior to accession to the treaty.

We always insisted that the people of South Africa have a right to this information. We still claim this right and insist that the government goes further than a simple presidential statement. We demand the release of Professor Mouton's report on the dismantling of all weapons in Armscor's possession.

We also insist that the government reveal what has happened to every gram of the stockpile of weapons grade uranium which international experts estimate at between 200 and 325 kilograms.

We demand this information because we challenge the president's statement on two counts.

Firstly, the president's statement that no testing of weapons has occurred contradicts evidence constantly aired since a double-flash, indicative of a nuclear test, was sighted in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979. He also contradicts his own statement that seven nuclear weapons were prepared in order to conduct tests.

Secondly, the president's statement that there was no foreign assistance to a local weapons programme contradicts substantial speculation that there was indeed foreign involvement. Obviously De Klerk was not keen to embarrass other governments, but this does not absolve him of the need to disclose this information.

Despite his appeal, we cannot believe that "South Africa's hands are clean" until we obtain full disclosure of all details of the weapons programme and its alleged dismantling, the stockpile of weapons-grade uranium, and the full extent of international co-operation with Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] and the Atomic Energy Corporation.

South Africa is persisting with weapons programmes and the development of delivery systems for its missiles. We need proof and guarantees that these programmes have no nuclear component if indeed we can make the claim that South Africa accedes to the OAU's aspiration of declaring Africa a nuclear weapon-free zone.

The ANC is committed to a policy of full disclosure. We consistently opposed a nuclear weapons programme, and continue to do so. Even as a deterrent, the nuclear weapons programme made no sense, and consumed an immense amount of the nation's scarce resources.

Despite the president's claim that doubts about the government's intentions must "for once and all be removed", we still need to have some vital questions answered.

**ANC Criticizes De Klerk Plan To Stem Violence***MB2403193093 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1845  
GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg March 24 SAPA—The African National Congress [ANC] on Wednesday [24 March] strongly criticised State President F W de Klerk's announcement of a 10-point plan of action and increased police and army powers to end violence in South Africa.

It also insisted the 18 Azanian Peoples Liberation Army [APLA] operatives arrested as part of the plan "be charged or released forthwith".

The ANC was reacting to a special address to a joint sitting of Parliament in which Mr de Klerk threw down the gauntlet to APLA, its backers and other militarised political parties.

"Given the National Party's record of lawlessness, we are extremely concerned at the undisclosed 10-point plan of action, and the implicit increase of powers for both police and army," the ANC said in a statement.

"The announcement of the arrest of unidentified people raises real concerns about detention without trial. We insist that these people be charged or released forthwith, that the government give public guarantees that no coercive measures be used to extract information, and that the next-of-kin be informed so that they are given the opportunity to arrange proper defence."

It also called for the names of all those arrested to be made public.

Reacting to the state president's announcement of a motion for a free vote in parliament on the re-implementation of the death penalty, the ANC said: "We reiterate the ANC's principled opposition to the death penalty, and regret that Mr de Klerk has taken this opportunity to reintroduce this matter, in such an emotive climate, when the existing moratorium should stand.

"We are living with the consequences of the destabilisation plans elaborated by leading military and police officials. Details of such a conspiracy have recently been disclosed in relation to the eastern Cape."

It said Mr de Klerk could demonstrate his serious intent to make the question of violence a major priority by acting against those who were implicated in the eastern Cape plot, in which senior military figures were accused of planning to topple the Ciskei government and form a Xhosa-based power bloc to oppose the ANC.

However, the ANC reiterated its condemnation of all the killings that have taken place and called on all South Africans not to allow themselves to be drawn deeper into the spiral of racially motivated violence.

"These murders are an act of provocation, designed to derail the negotiation and peace processes. The perpetrators should not be allowed to succeed, but must be brought to book to the full extent of the law."

**AZAPO Official's Statement Condemns Violence***MB2403182593 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1809  
GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] Pretoria Mar 24 SAPA—The Azanian People's Organisation [AZAPO] has criticised the "opportunism" of organisations such as the National Party [NP] which selectively condemned the killings of white people and pretended commitment to negotiations.

AZAPO Publicity Secretary Dr Gomolemo Mokae said in a statement on Wednesday his organisation upheld the philosophy of black consciousness, which was geared towards "re-humanising" blacks.

"Therefore, it is conceivable that AZAPO would not support any programme which seeks to dehumanise other people, irrespective of who they are. Therefore, AZAPO is as much outraged at the killings in Natal as it is by the recent Eikenhof killings," Dr Mokae said.

He was referring to deaths in continuing political violence in Natal, and an apparent ambush on motorists taking their children to school.

Dr Mokae said his organisation was duty-bound however to condemn the opportunism of parties like the NP who selectively condemned the killings of whites.

"The NP's hands are dripping with the blood of countless black activists like Steve Biko, Onkgopotse Tiro and Mapetla Mohapi, and still has to own up to its role in their deaths," he said.

It was "rich" of the NP to say it would not support the presence of parties committed to violence in negotiations.

"Its private armies, the South African Defence Force and South African Police, are still teeming with agents provocateur who are fomenting violence in the townships and in Natal," Dr Mokae alleged.

**Goldstone Issues Report on Azanian Army Aid***MB2403150593 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1342  
GMT 24 Mar 93*

[By Norman Patterson]

[Text] Pretoria Mar 24 SAPA—All nations should withhold assistance to APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] which, like the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC], propagated the armed struggle, a committee of the Goldstone Commission said in a report issued on Wednesday [24 March].

The committee, under chairman Gert Steyn, said there was a direct relationship between the Azanian People's Liberation Army and the PAC, which was responsible for ensuring that APLA was supplied with arms, equipment and financial means. APLA made no secret that its policy was to kill policemen, white farmers and whites in general. "Attacks that APLA claims to have carried out support this," said the committee's report on its preliminary findings into the activities of APLA.

The committee also found that APLA's internal high command for South Africa was based in the Transkei, which was being used as a springboard for attacks into South Africa. Furthermore, the police had informed the committee it had received information that APLA planned further attacks.

The committee recommended that all the parties engaged in the effort to reach a negotiated settlement should bring pressure to bear on the PAC and APLA to suspend the armed struggle and to join these parties in their search for a peaceful negotiated settlement. Through negotiations, pressure should be brought to bear on the PAC and other political parties to sign the National Peace Accord and to participate in the peace structures.

The committee recommended that the security forces protect South Africa's citizens to the best of their ability and arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of violence in terms of the common law.

The international community should bring pressure to bear on the PAC to cease to condone and support acts of violence by APLA and to join other political groups in South Africa in their search for a negotiated settlement.

The PAC controlled APLA's budget, the committee found.

The international community should also ascertain from the Tanzanian Government its response to allegations that APLA members were being trained at a formal base in the country.

The committee in addition requested the South African Government and all political groups in South Africa to ascertain from the Transkeian authorities their response to allegations that APLA members were being trained there and that the territory was used as a springboard for attacks against South African citizens.

According to the SAP [South African Police], APLA had about 120 members in South Africa who had undergone military training abroad. The number of recruits locally was not known.

The SAP estimated that APLA had about 2,700 members abroad, the majority of whom were in Tanzania. This number included women, children and persons working on agricultural projects.

The committee said much of the submissions were hearsay but that it was careful to have regard only to hearsay that could be regarded as reliable.

While all interested parties were publicly invited to make submissions, only the police and the South African Defence Force responded.

Goldstone Commission Chairman Mr Justice Richard Goldstone said in a covering letter the commission hoped that the Transkeian authorities, the PAC and APLA would reconsider their attitude, in which case the commission would reopen the proceedings.

If no response was forthcoming, these parties could not be heard to complain that the provisional findings were regarded as conclusive by local and international communities.

According to document, before the committee, APLA was responsible for the execution of the PAC's military policy as decided by the military commission.

It was believed that at least three members of the military commission were also members of the PAC's National Executive Council. They were Mr Johnson Mlambo, Mr Joe Makwanazi and Mr Thobile Gola.

It was further alleged that the PAC's president, Mr Clarence Makwetu, and the first deputy president, Mr Johnson Mlambo, served on the APLA high command.

The report quoted PAC Secretary-General Benny Alexander as having said, "the money of APLA comes via the liberation committee of the Organisation of African Unity and it is delivered to APLA by its offices in Dar-es-Salaam".

It was also alleged that apart from in Tanzania, APLA members received training in other African countries, Eastern Europe and Asia.

Court evidence showed that in the Transkei, training had taken place at Sterkspruit, Coffee Bay, Mount Frere and elsewhere. There would appear to be no permanent base.

Witnesses in a court case said the Transkeian authorities saw them but took no action.

The committee also found that the Transkeian government had supplied APLA with arms allegedly for VIP protection programmes.

Evidence was that APLA members had been found in possession of AK-47 assault rifles, Scorpion machine pistols, M-26 hand grenades, Chinese stick grenades and petrol bombs.

APLA members involved in attacks on police and civilians used R4 and R5 rifles and 9mm side-arms.

APLA members received training in the use of AK-47 assault rifles, Scorpion machine pistols, G3 assault rifles, SK5 assault rifles, hand grenades, Chinese stick grenades, land mines, mortars and RPG-7 rocket launchers.

According to a witness, they obtained weapons from places where they were stored in Transkei.



The SAP informed the committee that it was in possession of information that APLA used infiltration routes via Botswana through the Ramatlabama border post as well as an air route via Lesotho to Transkei.

It would appear the APLA had weapons available in Transkei and that these weapons were used in attacks on the police and members of the public.

The committee was informed the APLA's high command (external) was in overall command of all APLA's operations and activities, both inside South Africa and abroad.

It consisted of about 30 people under Johnson Mlambo as commander in chief.

According to the SAP, APLA's chain of command ran from the high command to regional commands to appropriate local commands. The necessary arms, ammunition or other equipment were also supplied by the regional commands.

The local commands identified the targets, plan the operations and ordered a particular unit to carry out the operation.

The same channels were followed to report back on action taken.

Units and local commands are not allowed to contact each other horizontally.

## 25 Mar Review of Press Editorials, Commentaries MB2503120293

[Editorial Report]

### THE CITIZEN

Criticism of 'Niceties' Concerning APLA—"If you find it curious that Minister of Law and Order Hennis Kriel has to ask the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] whether APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] has committed the latest atrocities against Whites, you should know that the police no longer have the intelligence network that enabled them previously to infiltrate organisations like APLA," begins a page 6 editorial in Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English on 23 March. The public is not concerned with "niceties" but wants "action to put an end to APLA's activities. That means it should be banned and its terrorists caught, tried and hanged (if they are sentenced to death). It is as simple as that."

### BUSINESS DAY

De Klerk Hits 'Right Note' in 24 Mar Speech—Referring to President de Klerk's special address to Parliament on 24 March, Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 25 March in a page 10 editorial says: "Although some may consider it to have been the proverbial damp squib, De Klerk hit the right note in his speech on violence yesterday afternoon—with two jarring exceptions." The

two exceptions relate to the question of civil rights and the possibility that the death penalty could be restored. BUSINESS DAY notes the "implication that the arrest of '18 known APLA operatives' for questioning represents a return to the old practice of arbitrary detention without trial. While the horrific nature of some of the recent killings may lead to a gut feeling among many decent people that extraordinary measures are justified, South Africa returns to this path at its peril." "On the whole, though, Nelson Mandela during his trip to Natal earlier this month, and now President de Klerk, have taken a commendable lead in the search for solutions to the problem of violence."

### SOWETAN

'Cancerous' Black Education Problem—"There is a desperate need to set up something like a Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa] to solve the cancerous black education problem," says a page 10 editorial in Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 25 March. "The longer the problem is allowed to go on the worse it becomes. The post-apartheid government will rue the delays, especially as it is glaringly obvious there is something fundamentally wrong with black education."

'Sinister' Forces Attempt To Begin Race War—A second editorial on the same page warns about the "start of a race war." "We have been very close to seeing civil war in Natal. The sinister forces responsible for the violence there probably realise that their attempts to bring total chaos to South Africa have failed." SOWETAN believes the Table Mountain massacres "were intended to halt negotiations and at the same time bring about civil strife. The attempt has failed. The same forces are now engaged in something more sinister—starting a race war."

### \* Report on Natal-KwaZulu Expenditures Detailed

93AF0405B Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English  
21 Jan 93 pp 1, 13

[Article by Terry McElligott]

[Text] Natal/KwaZulu is being grossly under-funded by the State, says a hard-hitting report released today—and it warns that this has led to a "deep sense of dissatisfaction" among the people of the region.

The report presents a detailed case for a better deal for the "Cinderella" Natal/KwaZulu region, which is being under-funded—in proportion to its population—to the tune of more than R1 billion for health, roads and education alone.

Health services are extremely disadvantaged, the road network is in crisis, and education is in a desperate position, it says. And the high level of poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment in the province is being seriously worsened.

The report was prepared by management consultants Deloitte and Touche for the KwaZulu/Natal Joint Executive Authority and was presented by Guy Harris at a function arranged by the Durban Regional Chamber of Business today.

"The wider political and socio-economic implications of the situation are undoubtedly enormous," it says. And it asks the Government: "What is going to be done to redress the imbalance?"

Among the points made are:

- Natal/KwaZulu has been a victim of apartheid bias in Government spending. The region's "Cinderella" status appears to have a lot to do with the relatively small proportion of whites in the population.

- It has the second biggest population among nine development areas in South Africa, but research suggests it receives the third smallest share of public-sector spending.

- Health expenditure per person is 77 per cent less than in the Cape Province, 24.2 per cent less than in the Free State and 12 per cent less than the Transvaal.

The region receives less than 20 per cent of the State's health funds and yet it has 25.9 per cent of the country's population.

- Of the nine development regions, Natal/KwaZulu receives the third lowest expenditure per school pupil and has the highest pupil/teacher ratio of 40:1. It receives R725 per pupil compared with the national average of R940.

- Expenditure on roads has plummeted by 55 per cent in real terms since 1980.

- The estimated shortfall in State allocations to Natal/KwaZulu included: Health services, R526 million; Roads, R76 million; Education, R580.5 million. These amounts total R1,182.5 million.

- The region is severely under-developed and although it has a virtually equal population to the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand Vereeniging] region, it receives Government consumption spending of less than one third of that of the PWV.

#### A Raw Deal

The standards of health care in Natal/KwaZulu will fall rapidly unless dramatic steps are taken to address the current imbalance in the allocation of Government health funds.

This is according to a report released today by the KwaZulu/Natal Joint Executive Authority, which reveals large disparities in the allocation of funds to the country's various regions.

There has been minimal correction of the health disparity in the 1992/93 year and, instead of steps being

taken to address the problem, Natal has recently been included in the national cutback on health services.

By March 1993, an as yet undetermined number of beds are to be closed and staff released.

One of the implications of the cutback decision, according to Peter Miller, MEC for Health Services, "includes some 500,000 patients being deprived of health services."

The report says some of the effects of underfunding the region's health services are:

- Only 35 per cent of cancer patients can be given treatment and only 10 per cent receive appropriate treatment.

- The administration is unable to address deficiencies in nursing staff levels—and the nurse-bed ratios are worse than in any other province.

- Lack of resources (funds and staff) allows only three out of every 10 patients with kidney failure to put on an appropriate treatment programme.

The population of Natal/KwaZulu is expected to double in less than 37 years, infant mortality is above average, preventative health services are inadequate, and diseases associated with poor socio-economic conditions are prevalent.

Yet the region has continued to be grossly underfunded relative to the other regions.

A provincial comparison of the ratio of nurses per hospital bed indicates the disadvantaged position of Natal, with the lowest ratio of all the provinces.

#### Regional Comparison Per Capita Allocation of Health Funds

Regions	Rand per capita	
	1991/92	1992/93
Cape Province	395	355
OFS	277	246
Transvaal	250	217
Natal	223	191

#### Regional Comparison Academic Hospitals (1992/93)

Regions	Budget per bed per day
Uni/National	650
HF Verwoed	625
Groote Schuur	578
Tygerberg	481
King Edward VII	253

**Government Expenditure Per Capita Black Education 1989**

Region	Expenditure Per Capita Expenditure (Rands)
Qwa Qwa	1,468
D.E.T.	930
Gazankulu	769
KwaNdebele	670
Lebowa	660
KaNgwane	655
Kwazulu	545

**Position Made Even Worse**

Of the nine South African development regions, Natal/KwaZulu received the third lowest Government expenditure per pupil in 1991, says the report.

This compounded an already desperate position, with Natal/KwaZulu having the highest pupil/teacher ratio of 40 to one.

Focusing more specifically on black education, a more dramatic situation emerges, with KwaZulu (based on 1989 figures) receiving the lowest expenditure per pupil among the self-governing territories' education departments. In addition, the pupil-teacher ratio was as high as 49-1.

Based on an acceptable pupil-teacher ratio of 35-1, KwaZulu needs an extra 11,800 teachers.

Of the total number of people in South Africa recorded as having no (or unspecified) education, Natal/KwaZulu has the highest percentage—24.8 per cent.

Despite the fact that education has a decided impact on employability, Government spending per pupil for the region continues to remain below the average expenditure for South Africa (1991).

The average for South Africa was R940 per pupil, compared with Natal/Kwazulu's R725 per pupil.

Relative to the national average, the region is underfunded by R215 per pupil, amounting to R580 million.

Intensifying the desperate situation is the fact that the region, compared to the rest of South Africa, is extremely short of teacher-training facilities.

**Natal Roads Crisis**

The road network in Natal is in crisis, says the report on State allocation of funds.

And Government expenditure on the province's roads, relative to the size of its population, is the lowest in South Africa.

The report says the disparity in funding is alarming.

Traffic volume on the roads has increased by 63 per cent since 1980, yet funds available for construction, rehabilitation and maintenance have decreased in real terms by 55 per cent.

Yet Natal's topography and climate make the maintenance and rehabilitation of its roads more expensive per kilometre and more frequently necessary.

The Natal Provincial Administration Roads Branch estimated it needed R80 million for rehabilitation work this financial year but only R15 million was granted.

An amount of R54 million was estimated for routine and periodic maintenance on blacktop roads this financial year but the allocation was only R36.7 million.

The report said the implications of Natal/KwaZulu's clearly disadvantaged position would be even more dramatic if the subsidisation of the road network by toll revenues and motor licence fees were removed from the equation.

Natal had a high number of toll roads and paid higher motor vehicle licence fees relative to some other provinces.

**\* Coal Mining, Exports, Reserves Evaluated****Export Profits Drop**

93AF0403A Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 22 Jan 93 pp 57-58

[Text] These are lean times for the coal mining industry which, after gold, is the largest earner of export revenues for the country, accounting for 13.9 per cent—R4.28bn—of the total R30.8bn which the Minerals Bureau says was earned by S.A. mineral exports in 1991.

On the face of it, conditions do not appear to be that bad, with the coal mining industry one of the very few sectors of the S.A. economy involved in heavy capital expenditure over the past few years. However, digging below the surface reveals a situation in which the major S.A. coal companies have become heavily dependent for their profits on the coal export market—and conditions in that market are grim.

At the end of 1991 the Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT) completed its R316m expansion to increase nominal export capacity from 44 Mt/year to 53 Mt/year, while the various RBCT members have spent some R3bn in total on expansions to meet their increased entitlements through the terminal.

Reason for all this investment is the forecast long-term growth trend in the coal business. Almorie Maule, Engen director, corporate planning, points out that total world demand for coal is expected to grow by around 2.5 per cent over the next decade, slightly increasing its present share of the world energy mix. Amcoal chairman David Rankin says his group forecasts a 2-per cent annual compound rate of growth over the next 15 years.



Significantly, Maule expects seaborne steam coal exports to grow at a faster rate, rising by 5-7 per cent annually as uneconomic production in Europe is phased out.

Trans-Natal Coal (TNC) MD Mike Salamon says the market for export steam coal should grow to about 235 Mt annually by 1995 and 300 Mt or more by the turn of the century.

So much for the good news. The bad news is that a number of factors have combined to create a short-term slump in coal export prices, which has battered the earnings of the S.A. coal exporters at a time when they had hoped to boost their business with the lifting of sanctions measures against them in various markets since the beginning of 1990.

Sanctions on the S.A. coal companies had triggered a round of savage price competition by the S.A. exporters to maintain sales volumes, creating the so-called "political discount" on S.A. prices. While export volumes were maintained, profits suffered. Sanctions are now a thing of the past but low prices are still very much with the industry.

Overall problem is, of course, the prolonged recession in the world's major economies, combined with a series of mild northern hemisphere winters which has meant even less demand for coal.

Demand has increased but the FINANCIAL TIMES INTERNATIONAL COAL REPORT points out 1992 should record the smallest increase in world thermal coal imports since 1986, forecast at about 9.5 Mt, with Europe and the Mediterranean region taking a mere 2.5 Mt extra. Combined with this has been an overabundance of supply from the existing producers and a number of newcomers to the business, particularly Indonesia, Colombia and Venezuela.

The result has been a horrific drop in coal prices on the spot market, which has serious implications for the current round of price negotiations for coal supplied on long-term contracts. The coal exporters try to place as much of their sales volumes as possible through long-term contracts which are negotiated for European delivery in December-January and for Far East customers in about February-March.

Benchmark price in Europe is the settlement with Italian power utility Enel, which for 1992 delivery was set at US\$31.80/t. Since then the spot price of coal free-on-board (FOB) Richards Bay has slumped to around \$24/t-\$25/t.

Industry executives are adamant that virtually no one can be making profits at these sort of prices, yet the coal goes out. Reason is marginal costing on sales, with all the exporters pointing fingers at each other as the culprits indulge in the practice.

Once an exporter has sold enough coal to cover his working and capital costs for the year, sales volumes over and above this are still contributing to cash flow even if

they are not profitable. The temptation is to accept lower prices to move the coal rather than sit with it.

Randcoal CE Allen Cook reckons that's precisely what the Australians are doing in Europe, where S.A. companies should have a competitive edge because they face much lower freight charges to Europe. "The Australians are dumping coal in Europe at \$25/t and they simply cannot be making money on those sales."

Trouble is, the extent of sales on marginal costing is now threatening the core contract business on which the S.A. exporters depend, and RBCT chairman Allen Sealey confirms that even RBCT members have been in there selling at spot prices as low as \$24/t. He won't name names.

Comments Cook: "It's a trap because at the end of the year you have to face your long-term customers, who are not going to be impressed by your pitch for high contract prices if they know you have been selling spot cargoes at prices up to \$7/t below what you are now asking."

Negotiations are not helped by the structure of the market. Salamon points out the steam coal export business is dominated by buyers from just 23 utility companies in Europe and the Far East. "Financially, we, the producers, are midgets compared to our coal customers," he says.

Cook divides the utilities into three broad groups. First are those which are prepared to pay a fair price for their coal because they are concerned about security of supply. Next are those which want long-term supply contracts but at prices closer to spot levels, and finally those which deal predominantly on the spot market and demand spot prices. "These guys will squeeze the last cent out of the producer," says Cook.

The S.A. coal companies are loath to make predictions on 1993 prices when they are involved in actual negotiations, as at present, but all are worried about the effect of the very low spot prices on 1993 contract agreements. "Inevitably, there must be some effect on the contract price levels," says Rankin.

Question seems to be just how much contract prices will drop as even the most optimistic of the S.A. exporters is hoping for roll-over prices at best. Looking longer-term, there is a considerable divergence of views on coal price movements despite the expected growing market.

RBCT and Randcoal chairman Allen Sealey is pessimistic. "I believe the coal price over the next five years is not going to rise in real terms above the present contract price level of about \$32/t. I am not budgeting for increases in coal prices of more than 3 per cent or 4 per cent a year, which is about the nominal rate of inflation in the U.S."

"There's just too much coal around and it's relatively easy to get into this business. To survive in this market we have to get our costs down and improve our productivity," he says.



That's why the existing S.A. coal exporters are wary of committing themselves to further expansion of their own business above the 53 Mt mark and are so against the proposed new South Dunes Terminal (see separate story), which could be set up in opposition to them, exporting around 10 Mt-12 Mt annually.

Salamon points out the capital cost of setting up a new greenfields colliery is around R250 per annual ton of production capacity. Required return on that capital investment is around 20 per cent, or R50/t. Operating costs to mine and wash the coal for export are on average R37/t. Add another R28/t on average for railage to Richards Bay and R7-R10 for terminal and harbour charges and you come up with a cost to put coal on a ship of R122/t-R125/t.

At current exchange rates the \$30/t contract price works out to R90/t and a spot price of \$24/t amounts to just R72/t, which means the average RBCT exporter would at best break even on his cash costs of R72/t-R75/t.

"We need another \$10/t to be added to coal contract prices before any new investment makes sense. Every bit of our brownfields expansion capacity has been plugged in to get to an export level of 53 Mt/year. Further expansion needs greenfields capacity to be installed but before we do that we want to see a more tangible improvement in the coal market than just drawing graphs showing rising trends," says Salamon.

He adds there is no point in installing the capacity to meet higher forecast demands ahead of a price rise because the producers will then face an ever greater uphill battle to achieve higher prices. He points out, however, that eventually both the S.A. and Australian coal industries will have to invest in greenfields capacity to meet the forecast growth in world demand to more than 300 Mt by the end of the decade.

The RBCT is expected to reach its new maximum throughput of 53 Mt by 1995. While the current mood is one of gloom and doom, a more optimistic viewpoint is being put forward by UK-based McCloskey Coal Information Services (MCIS) which publishes the authoritative FINANCIAL TIMES INTERNATIONAL COAL REPORT.

MCIS reckons this year could see a rebound in spot prices because of forecast higher demand for steam coal, with the market rising by at least 17 Mt compared with the 9.5 Mt increase for 1992. MCIS reckons the increase in demand could be as high as 25 Mt if the U.K., Indian and U.S. utilities come into the market in a big way.

MCIS is forecasting that contract prices for 1993 delivery will drop on average \$1/t-\$3/t and buyers might well opt for greater tonnages on long-term supply deals, given the expectation that spot prices will firm and so narrow the gap with contract levels.

That makes for interesting negotiations and, hopefully, the coal exporters will not find themselves in a situation of having agreed to lower contract prices only to watch the spot market take off.

Longer-term predictions are complicated by a number of factors, not least of which is the likely trend of sales from a number of countries such as the CIS. Salamon says export volumes from the CIS have to drop once correct costing becomes a factor, which it is not at present. He points out coal is being railed 3,000 km inside the CIS for the ludicrous cost of \$1/t.

Salamon adds exports from Indonesia, currently running at around 12 Mt/year, could easily rise to 20 Mt-25 Mt but then should level off because of rising domestic demand from its burgeoning population.

JCI executive director Michael Hawarden comments there are a lot of older and uneconomic coal mines in Australia which are near closure, and he feels even the Colombians are battling at current prices.

"They talk very aggressively about exponential growth but the reality is we may not see it."

### Long-Term Contracts Lacking

93AF0403B Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 22 Jan 93 pp 58-61

[Text] S.A.'s coal exports were particular targets for the sanctions measures introduced against the country from 1986 onwards but the coal exporters managed to maintain export levels at the design capacity of the Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT).

Given the pressures on the industry, that was a magnificent effort, but the costs of four years of sanctions are now becoming apparent in the changes that have taken place in fundamental position of the S.A. coal export industry compared with its main competition.

From the end of 1986 the S.A. companies lost 10.5 Mt in annual sales to France, Denmark and the United States, while offtake by Japan dropped gradually from 8.4 Mt in 1986 to 4.8 Mt in 1990.

The RBCT export statistics show markets for those tonnages were found elsewhere as, with the exception of 1987, export volumes were either maintained or increased.

The figures in the table, however, tell only one side of the story because S.A. producers paid a heavy price in lost revenues through lower prices earned on their coal. They also lost market share as they were largely excluded from the new growth taking place in the market.

In particular, SA companies were unable to tender for long-term contracts to supply several new power stations being brought on-line in Japan. The bulk of that business went to the Australians instead.

Putting it in perspective, Trans-Natal Coal (TNC) MD Mike Salamon says that from 1985-1992 the total traded seaborne steamcoal market increased by about 65 Mt, or 52 per cent. Half this increase was accounted for by Colombia, Venezuela and Indonesia, countries which were not exporters of coal before 1985.

During this period the South Africans managed a paltry 15 per cent growth, while Australia's exports jumped 56 per cent to 58 Mt, the United States increased its exports by 55 per cent and China managed a 300-per cent leap in exports.

Compounding the situation is the ground the S.A. companies have lost in their production efficiencies. Salamon says in the mid-Eighties S.A.'s 30-per cent market share represented the bottom 30 per cent of the international FOB cash cost curve. Today, SA's approximately 23 per cent market share is well into the second quartile of costs.

"We've lost our competitive edge," agrees Randcoal CE Allen Cook.

Salamon attributes this to low labour costs, attractive stripping ratios which reduce mine operating costs, and the close proximity to the coasts of the Indonesian, Colombian and Venezuelan mines. In addition, there have been significant improvements in productivity in both Australia and the U.S., while in Australia there have been reductions in port, rail and tax charges.

In the competitive steamcoal market these factors have acted to depress prices, with producers typically passing cost reductions directly to consumers," says Salamon.

In S.A.'s case, the effect of high domestic inflation on labour, stores and railage costs was not adequately compensated for by either improvements in productivity or a weakening of the rand against the U.S. dollar, in which all export sales are denominated.

That's why the industry is starting to place so much emphasis on improving productivity as the key to holding down costs and surviving current market conditions. The companies face an uphill battle against the unions, which so far have refused to accept wage increases below inflation.

The stage is being set for a tough confrontation if the coal market remains oversupplied and prices stay low. "We have been granting pay increases above the inflation rate but not getting corresponding increases in productivity. It can't go on and, frankly, we are paying our labour too much at present.

"We are up against competitors who don't have to deal with trade unions, whose wage levels are lower and who don't face the same pressures we do," warns one coal company executive.

Salamon points out the real productivity problem lies with the older mines that have been in operation for

some 15-20 years because he feels the new mines the major S.A. coal groups have installed are as good as they come by world standards.

"Productivity on our best mines is some two to three times the industry average, so the potential for further reductions in costs on new projects is limited," he says.

The coal majors have responded to the pressures with some impressive cost performances. TNC held its increase in unit mining costs to just 6.6 per cent in the year to June although unit sales costs are 11.4 per cent because of the trend of growing export sales and declining sales to Eskom. Eskom coal is cheaper to produce because it does not have to be washed. Amcoal managed to keep its increase in unit sales costs to 6.1 per cent in the year to March after a 10.2 per cent rise for the 1991 year.

The trend must be more of the same or better if the major S.A. coal companies are to survive in their highly competitive business.

### **Richards Bay Terminal Described**

93AF0403C Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 22 Jan 93 pp 61-62

[Text] S.A. ranks third in the world league of coal exporters—after Australia and the United States—but is unique in that the bulk of its exports are shipped through one terminal, the Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT), the world's largest coal export facility.

Coal exports from S.A. in calendar 1991 totalled 48.5 Mt, of which 45.3 Mt—93 per cent—went through Richards Bay. In December 1991 the RBCT completed a R316m programme on schedule and under budget to expand capacity to a nominal 53 Mt/year. A subsequent reorganisation at the terminal has pushed this nominal figure to 54.5 Mt.

Given current market conditions, the RBCT is not expected to move this volume of coal until about 1995 and estimates are 48 Mt will have been exported through Richards Bay in calendar 1992.

The terminal handles 34 different grades of coal and, with the new stockyards added by the expansion, can stockpile up to 6 Mt, although stock levels normally run at about half that level. RBCT management stresses the terminal is a handling facility not a storage facility.

Trains are despatched for Richards Bay from the eastern Transvaal coalfields at rates of up to 12 every 24 hours and each train can consist of up to 200 "jumbo wagons." That would give each train a total length of 2.7 km, delivering 16,800 t of coal.

The full trains entering the terminal are passed through tandem tipplers which up-end the trucks two at a time to unload the coal. The expansion programme added a fourth tandem tippler to the three already in operation

and the existing three were upgraded so that all now have an unloading capacity of 5,500 t/hour.

The coal is then sent along conveyor belts to the stockyard to be stored on stacks until a ship arrives to collect it. Then the product is reclaimed from the stacks and loaded into the waiting vessel. This entire process is computer-controlled by operators in the terminal's control tower who select the most efficient handling route using conveyor belts and stacker/reclaimer equipment to get the coal from the trains to the stockyards and then into the ships.

The terminal now has six stacker/reclaimers with peak working rates of 6,000 t/hour, two stackers with peak rates of 5,500 t/hour, and one reclaimer which has a peak operating rate of 5,000 t/hour.

The RBCT has four quays, each of which can take a vessel of around 150,000 deadweight tons (DWT). The Richards Bay Port Authority places a maximum limit of 200,000 dwt on ships which can safely use the port and the terminal's operations are geared to handling such large vessels, which are known in the trade as Cape-sized.

The minimum amount of a particular type of coal that the RBCT will load into a ship at one time is 25,000 t and a ship will not be allowed into port unless the coal it has come to collect is on the ground in the stockyards, with a 10-per cent extra contingency.

Shipping movements are critical to the smooth operation of the terminal, according to RBCT public affairs manager Chris Crampton. Each vessel due to take on coal from the terminal has a two-week window around its estimated date of arrival, and if it reaches port during this period, will be considered to have arrived on time.

That's the theory but, in reality, bad weather and a myriad other factors that affect shipping movements can play havoc with shipping schedules, causing "bunching" of ships. Then the vessels have to swing at anchor for long periods in the "roads" outside the port waiting for their turn to berth and load up.

The port of Richards Bay changed its operations schedule as part of the terminal's expansion and is now open 24 hours a day throughout the year.

Crampton points out the RBCT is unique in that it publishes a schedule of standard rates of loading. The terminal, for example, commits itself to loading cargoes of 140,000 t and greater at a standard rate of 50,000 t/day, weather permitting.

There are three shiploaders in operation at present, of which two can load at maximum rates of 8,500 t/hour and one at 10,000 t/hour.

Precisely how much coal the terminal could shift is a topic of great interest on which RBCT management will not provide a definitive answer. The nominal annual rate is now 54.5 Mt but analysts reckon the terminal could easily better this with the present infrastructure.

In December 1991—the month in which the expansion was completed—the RBCT shifted 5 Mt in one month, equivalent to an annualised rate of 60 Mt. Management reckons that rate is not sustainable. Operations planning manager Andre Swanepoel says the throughput was the result of a favourable shipping programme as well as reduced maintenance work on some of the equipment to keep the coal flowing over this limited period.

Bottom line is that the terminal has played a huge part in establishing the reputation for reliability of supply that the S.A. coal exporters enjoy with their customers and which is an important factor in coal contract negotiations.

The terminal has never declared force majeure on contracts—meaning it cannot operate because of forces beyond its control—not even when Cyclone Domoina swept the area.

### Alternative Ports Assessed

93AF0403D Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English 22 Jan 93 pp 62-65

[Text] The coal majors are complaining bitterly about current market conditions but their situation is far better than that of the smaller coal companies which do not have access to Richards Bay and instead have to export through Durban or Maputo.

A number of Natal collieries have gone bust during the past two years, including two members of the Durban Coal Terminal Co (DCTC), the company which operates the main coal-loading facility in Durban, known as the Bluff Mechanical Appliance (BMA).

Also indicative of the squeeze on the little guys, as seen in the accompanying table, is the declining trend in exports through Durban, which stands in sharp contrast to the steady growth shown by the Richards Bay Coal Terminal.

In addition, coal exports through Maputo, a harbour which could handle 2 Mt annually with its present infrastructure, have dried up completely from S.A. despite Maputo being the closest export point for coal mines in the eastern Transvaal.

Under normal conditions that would make Maputo the natural export route for these mines because of the low transport costs involved.

Times are not normal. DCTC chairman Barry Farr says the flow of S.A. coal to Maputo has stopped and the Matola Export Committee (MEC—an organisation of S.A. coal exporters using Maputo) disbanded because of disruptions on the rail line to Maputo caused by the civil war. Only coal still moving through the port is some 150,000 t/year from Swaziland.

Reason for the falling export tonnages through Durban is the profit squeeze caused by dropping coal prices and the much higher costs of using Durban as opposed to Richards Bay.



The crucial factor is railage charges. It costs on average R60 to rail a ton of coal from the eastern Transvaal to Durban, compared with about R28 to get that same ton of coal to Richards Bay. Railage rates hold the key to the future of Durban as an export port, particularly given the slump in the Natal coal industry, which means more export volumes will have to be attracted from the Transvaal to maintain economies of scale.

Farr points out the "bread and butter" coal business through Durban is the 1 Mt/year throughput of sized anthracite destined mainly for European customers. It's a regular business and sized anthracite is a product which commands a premium price but requires "soft" handling and loading procedures to avoid degradation.

"Ideally, you'd like to wrap each piece of anthracite in cotton wool," comments one sarcastic mine manager. Anthracite exports, for this reason, normally do not go through Richards Bay where the accent is on the rapid loading of vast volumes of steamcoal.

Durban's next main export is about 0.8 Mt/year of sized lean coal, also known as "fines" or "duff." It's this market which has been badly hit by falling dollar prices and dropping duff export volumes are responsible for the downward trend in coal exports via Durban.

The Natal collieries have been the worst affected because their working costs are generally higher than Transvaal collieries, resulting from their more complicated geology and difficult mining conditions.

Another trend apparent from the Durban coal export statistics is the steadily rising volume going through the BMA which is being upgraded by the DCTC in accordance with its agreement with Portnet. The BMA will eventually become the only facility to handle coal exports through Durban.

At present, coal is shipped mainly through the BMA but can also be exported off the general crane berths in Durban as well as two of the private terminals—Durban Bulk Shipping and Maydon Wharf Five.

The BMA was owned by Portnet—then called Sats—but was privatised in September 1988 in a deal with the coal exporters which had the long-term aim of making the BMA the only coal-handling facility in Durban, with a target throughput capacity of 5 Mt/year. Once the BMA had reached these levels, the other berths would be closed to coal exports.

That strategic, long-term aim remains unchanged but the numbers have been revised somewhat. Farr says agreement with Portnet is that the BMA will reach a throughput of 2.5 Mt annually within five years from January 1991.

Force of events has already limited the facilities available elsewhere in the port for loading coal and, in one way, the falling coal export volumes have helped the logistics of running Durban.

Reason is the drought and the massive shipments of grain coming in through Durban for distribution to the whole of southern Africa. "The two private terminals have been almost wholly engaged in handling grain imports and this seems likely to last for some years," says Farr.

The DCTC is spending about R3m annually on maintaining the BMA's existing throughput and on installing new capacity. The money is raised through a levy of R1.60 on every ton of coal exported by a DCTC member through Durban, whether via the BMA or any other facility.

"We will carry on investing this level of funds provided the market is there for these volumes of coal exports," says Farr.

That's where the move to attract greater volumes of coal from the Transvaal becomes important to replace the falling tonnages from Natal's declining coal industry and maintain the economies of scale through the BMA.

Farr says negotiations with Spoornet on changes to the rail tariffs are still in progress and he cannot provide specifics. However, in broad terms, the aim is to achieve a reduction in railage cost by using longer trains with larger-capacity wagons.

He comments the plan is to move from trains that are 39 trucks long, with each truck having a 32 t capacity, to 50-truck trains where each truck has a 48 t capacity. That would double train payloads from 1,200 t of coal to 2,400 t.

"Spoornet has indicated that given these changes a reduction in railage charges is possible and future annual increases could be held to around 4 per cent or 5 per cent. If we can achieve this I'd be delighted," says Farr.

DCTC members at present pay a fee of R12.87/t plus the R1.60 levy to export coal through the BMA, which compares with costs of R7/t-R10/t to use Richards Bay. Part of the privatisation deal with Portnet was that occasional users who were not DCTC members would also be able to export through the BMA should they want to.

Farr says the BMA has the spare capacity for such exporters although present market conditions mean there are few takers. He says occasional users are charged 10 per cent more than the R12.87/t charged to DCTC members because the members are funding the capital needed to upgrade the terminal.

Developments over the proposed South Dunes Terminal at Richards Bay obviously hold major implications for Durban as a coal export port, given that the South Dunes users would pay the same railage as the RBCT members and that's half the charge of railage via Durban.

Farr acknowledges this but points out he still thinks Durban would retain its core business in sized anthracite exports which require careful handling. Anthracite is

loaded out of the rail wagons onto the ships and not stockpiled in stacks as would be the case at South Dunes.

### **Richards Bay Expansion Criticized**

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English 22 Jan 93 pp 65-66

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] The S.A. coal exporters have often been their own worst enemies when it comes to price negotiations and have time and again cut each other's throats, as well as those of their main Australian opposition, in drives to garner business.

That's one reason why the moves to establish a second coal-loading terminal at Richards Bay—the South Dunes Terminal or Red Terminal as many refer to it—is causing such controversy.

The proposed terminal will have an initial annual capacity of 10 Mt/12 Mt. It was dubbed the Red Terminal by former Amcoal and RBCT chairman Graham Boustred because the proposed site was outlined in red in the first maps he obtained of the project.

The existing RBCT exporters claim there is no way such a new terminal can be justified, given current and expected market conditions. The backers of the South Dunes Terminal counter that the RBCT members are talking to their own book and are trying to keep a tight grip on the market.

The matter is complicated by the fact that a number of existing RBCT members are also members of the South Dunes Coal Export joint venture (Coalex).

These include Agip, Duiker and Gold Fields Coal although GF Coal maintains that it is not actually involved in the project—instead the active company is controlling mining house Gold Fields of S.A. Talk about splitting hairs.

Another point of controversy concerns the main backer for South Dunes—synthetic fuel giant Sasol.

Sasol is keen to export a minimum of 3 Mt of coal annually and is widely recognised as the anchor company for the project. The other members, in addition to those already named, are Anglovaal, Iscor, MacPhail and Tselentis Mining.

Most coal company executives accept that Sasol would make a responsible coal exporter—the group is a financial powerhouse and big enough not to be pressurised into bargain basement coal sales which could wreck the market for everyone.

However, what a number of coal executives do not like is the possibility of Sasol using taxpayers' money, in the form of government fuel subsidies on its core synfuel business, to subsidise its coal exports.

"That would make a mockery of working cost calculations on the economic viability of Sasol's exports—they could simply pick a number to justify their decision to export.

"They intend exporting the coal, come hell or high water, and it burns me up that they might be using my tax money to do so," says an executive director of one major exporter.

Sasol Mines GM Chris Cloete rejects these allegations. "The Sasol coal business is managed as a profit centre based on market-related transfer pricing of coal. Capital projects are considered on financial merit and the tariff protection on our oil-from-coal business has nothing to do with our coal export business."

The RBCT members are sceptical and reckon a new terminal cannot be justified financially, given the current and expected short-term economic conditions in the coal export markets.

"There is no way you can justify building this terminal, which must cost in the region of R600m to R700m. At a coal price of \$32/t the rate of return on the investment does not make it worth putting in a greenfields coal terminal and I do not believe the coal price is going to rise in real terms above the current contract rate in the next five years," says RBCT chairman Allen Sealey.

Cloete does not accept this view. "Of course the RBCT would like to maintain their monopolistic position in order to protect their vested interests against competition from those excluded from the RBCT.

"We are currently doing a feasibility study which takes economic and market factors into account. The decision is to be taken on bottom-line figures and we still have two options open to us. However, Sasol will keep on collaborating with the RBCT.

"The decline in coal production in Europe and Germany, together with the 70 Mt growth in Eastern markets in the next decade, provides a definite opportunity. Other suppliers also believe the present oversupply situation can change from 1995," he says.

Significantly, it appears the RBCT is bowing to the inevitable and is actually looking at ways and means of accommodating the Coalex partners within the existing terminal.

Coalex has appointed U.S. company Soros and Associates to undertake a feasibility study on a new South Dunes Terminal but is also talking to the RBCT about an alternative greenfields terminal adjacent to the RBCT. Sealey says the RBCT has agreed to undertake a feasibility study on this but Cloete says discussions are still under way.

Cloete will not comment on Coalex's estimates over the cost of a new terminal but industry sources say Coalex is looking at a figure of around R400m. That, in turn, is another cause of friction between the RBCT and Coalex

members because of the perceived impact the activities of Coalex might have on the RBCT's hard-won reputation for reliability.

Asks Randcoal CE Allen Cook: "What happens if they build an 'el cheapo' terminal and something breaks down disrupting coal deliveries? Rightly or wrongly the customer backlash to that will affect all the S.A. exporters, not just the Coalex members."

One of the reasons Spoornet and Portnet are so keen on the new terminal is that the Richards Bay line has the capacity to handle the extra tonnages—all that is needed is more rolling stock.

Further, the RBCT and Coalex will have to work closely together on truck movements through the marshalling yards at Richards Bay to avoid snarl-ups.

Bringing the Coalex partners into the RBCT itself is fraught with difficulties because of the vested interest of the present members in the terminal.

The RBCT as it stands has a certain inherent "brown-fields" expansion capability and analysts believe the throughput could be pushed from the present 54.5 Mt to perhaps 65 Mt with relatively limited additional capital expenditure.

However, that capacity belongs to the existing members and most seem extremely reluctant to give any of it up to bring in Sasol, or anyone else. Reason why Agip, GF Coal and Duiker are involved with Coalex is because they cannot export as much coal as they would like to, due to their limited RBCT allocations.

JCI was initially believed to be part of Coalex but has decided to remain strictly within the RBCT structure. Executive director Michael Hawarden makes it clear JCI will jealously guard its relatively limited RBCT entitlement, acquired via joint ventures and the unbundling of the Transvaal Coal Owners' Association (TCOA).

"We have served notice on the RBCT board that we will not be prepared to find ourselves in a prejudiced position in the event that new exporters are accommodated within the RBCT. We are not prepared to stand back and let such newcomers get preferential treatment although perhaps the larger RBCT users might do so," says Hawarden.

The larger RBCT members appear to want all their quota as well. Comments Amcoal chairman David Rankin: "Every individual member has the right to sell a portion of its throughput capacity at RBCT and I suppose it might be attractive if the price was right. However, I doubt we would sell any of our RBCT throughput because we are long-term players in this business."

That seems to set the stage for some delicate negotiations which will be crucial for the future of the entire S.A. coal export industry.

### New Processing Methods

93AF0403F Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English 22 Jan 93 p 69

[Text] Enertek, the CSIR's [Council for Scientific Division of Energy Technology, has come up with two new developments which should help the coal industry in its constant striving to lower costs, improve efficiencies and reduce the environmental problems associated with its operations.

The first is the "Magmiser" which will improve the recovery of magnetite, used as a dense medium in coal-preparation plants. This will reduce costs and improve process efficiencies.

The Magmiser is designed to help solve the financial and environmental problems of fine coal which is high grade but still ends up on waste dumps because the dense media separation (DMS) washing plants cannot handle it.

Dumps of waste coal, if not properly designed and managed, can be major sources of pollution. Water running off the dumps can pollute ground water sources, turning them acidic while, should the dumps catch fire through spontaneous combustion, the resulting fumes add to the acid rain problem in the eastern Transvaal as well as causing severe local air pollution.

The Magmiser consists of an inclined conveyor belt travelling upwards and passing over a magnet. The first Magmiser was installed at Amcoal's Kleinkopje Colliery, where it has reduced the normal loss in operations of 0.3 g/t of magnetite to 0.06 g/t.

Recovering the fine coal is only half the battle because the product then has to be dried before it can be sold to the customer. Fine coal can be dewatered in a centrifuge to a moisture content of about 20 per cent, which is still too high, and is then normally put through rotary driers to get the moisture content down to an acceptable 7 per cent.

Enertek director Dieter Krueger reckons Enertek has come up with a better, more efficient method of drying the coal, using fluidised-bed driers. Fluidised-bed technology is one of the great environmental hopes for the future of the coal industry because it will burn many products, such as discard, duff and fine coal, that the industry normally dumps as waste.

Enertek's second technological thrust is the development of the "Kangela" device for continuously monitoring the ash content of a stream of coal with the aim of preventing bad coal (with a high ash content) reaching the customer and good coal (low ash content) being dumped on the waste piles.

The S.A. industry at present uses a number of imported ash monitors but Krueger says the Kangela will be superior regarding calibration, accuracy and reliability, and will also cost about 30 per cent less than the imported models.



It works by scanning a stream of coal over a specific period, say the time a conveyor belt carrying the coal takes to complete one or more revolutions, and then reports the average ash value of the coal scanned in that period.

Ash in coal has a greater effective atomic number than the carbon content and, as a result, has a greater absorption of gamma radiation. The monitor works by measuring the difference in gamma radiation absorbed to get a direct measure of the ash content.

The Kangel is a joint venture between Enertek and the Atomic Energy Corp. which developed the nuclear technology required. Krueger says it has been extensively tested at Iscor's Grootegeluk Colliery, where its accuracy in a production environment has been proven.

Another part of Enertek's research on the utilisation of coal fines involves forming the material into pellets or briquettes which can be handled readily in furnaces, unlike fine materials which can clog up the furnaces.

Krueger says 25 per cent of Enertek's budget is spent on research into subjects which involve environmental issues in coal mining.

This is an area, he feels, in which the S.A. coal industry is lagging way behind its competitors in the funding of research, and recent changes to the legislation have not helped.

When government last year scrapped the Coal Act it also ended a research levy that was charged on every ton of coal produced. At the same time government also ended its former commitment to provide matching funds for the total amount raised from the coal sector, which amounted to some R4.5m annually. The bulk of that money went to the CSIR [Council for Scientific and Industrial Research].

"At one stroke R9m out of an annual budget of R17m earmarked for coal research was wiped out. The amount involved is probably peanuts to the coal industry but it would enable us to provide them with significant research and development support," says Krueger.

"The coal companies had always complained about paying this levy on the grounds that they had limited say over how the money was spent, and rightly so. When it became apparent the levy was going to be removed I approached them to say they should continue to collect, invest and manage these funds, but by means of industry representatives.

"Instead, the money was just dried up. I feel this reflects short-sightedness on the part of the S.A. coal industry. The Australian coal companies, for example, pay a levy of 5c/t for research compared with the 1.7c that the S.A. companies had to pay," says Krueger.

### **Eskom Cutbacks Reduce Demand**

93AF0403G Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English 22 Jan 93 pp 69-70

[Text] Eskom business is keenly sought by the major S.A. coal groups because they view it as a solid demand pillar on which to base their operations, and one which is far more stable than the volatile export market.

Eskom's power stations burnt 70.5 Mt in calendar 1991 and that's why the repercussions on the industry were severe when the Eskom pillar started creaking some five years ago as the utility faced up to the serious problem caused by its surplus generating capacity.

The utility had committed itself to a huge capital expansion programme to meet forecast rates of growth in energy demand during the Eighties which simply did not materialise as the S.A. economy slumped and failed to perform as expected.

Eskom's problems not only knocked forecast rates of growth in the domestic coal market on the head, by delaying the commissioning of the new generating sets on order, but the utility also started whittling into existing business.

A number of Eskom's smaller, older power stations were closed down and mothballed to concentrate power generation on the newer, more thermally efficient stations, and worst hit was Trans-Natal Coal Corp (TNC).

Amcoal and Randcoal were the winners in the last round of Eskom tenders awarded in 1981 and both groups are benefiting from growth in their sales to Eskom, even if this is slower than anticipated.

TNC did not win any of the contracts for new power stations and its collieries supplied two of the older power stations which Eskom mothballed—Komati and Camden.

As a result, TNC's sales volume to Eskom has dropped 50 per cent from 19.4 Mt in 1988 to 9.8 Mt in the year to June 1992, while export volumes have risen 36 per cent from 8.2 Mt to 11.3 Mt over the same period. By comparison, Amcoal's Eskom sales are largely unchanged over this period at 30 Mt.

Amcoal will be hit this year by Eskom's decision to place four of the six generating sets at its Arnot power station in reserve storage for an indefinite period. That will drop Arnot's coal demand to 2 Mt in the year to March from 5.11 Mt the previous year.

This decision by Eskom shows just how serious the surplus generating capacity problem is because Arnot rated as Eskom's sixth-best power station in terms of thermal efficiency during 1991.

The details of the supply contracts between Eskom and the collieries supplying the various power stations are among the most closely guarded secrets in the business. Amcoal chairman David Rankin, for example, declines



to comment on the financial arrangements at Arnot to compensate Amcoal for the drop in production.

In broad terms, the contracts are on a cost plus basis and the coal mining groups are guaranteed a return of around 18 per cent on the investments they make in the collieries set up to supply the power stations. Eskom pays this as a rand per ton amount on the coal sold from the colliery to the power station.

Eskom CE Ian McCrae says the utility's current assigned, sent-out capacity of 36,228 MW is enough to supply demand up to the year 2000. During 1991 Eskom had 5,061 MW of generating capacity either mothballed or in reserve storage.

McCrae reckons that if demand grows according to the most optimistic scenario new plant will probably be required by the winter of 2000. Contract to supply that power station—Lekwe—was also awarded in 1981 to Amcoal, which will supply it from its New Cornelia colliery.

Eskom achieved a 14-per cent drop in the real price of power in S.A. in the five years to 1991 and has committed itself to a further 20-per cent drop over the following five years.

McCrae says the coal mining industry has been making exceptional efforts to contain costs and improve productivity. Average cost per ton of coal burnt by Eskom's power stations rose just 7.5 per cent to R25.7/t in 1991 from R23.9/t in 1990 despite the average S.A. domestic inflation rate of some 15 per cent.

Given the importance the coal producers place on Eskom business, it's not surprising the alarm bells went off long and loud over the geological problems revealed in November at Randcoal's Majuba colliery. This mine is to supply Eskom's Majuba power station, where the first generating set is due to start burning coal in 1996.

The coal deposits of the south-eastern Transvaal are known to be more disturbed and difficult to mine than those around Witbank but Eskom deliberately sited the Majuba power station near Amersfoort to spread the pollution load.

In so doing it accepted the cost of the coal to be supplied from Majuba would be some 20 per cent higher than average at an estimated R30/t. Trouble is, the geology of the coal deposits turned out to be far more disturbed than believed when Eskom accepted the tender.

The initial geological drilling and assessment work carried out by Randcoal in accordance with its agreement with Eskom failed to detect the extent to which vertical dykes and sills had intruded into the coal beds. This only became apparent when underground development of the colliery started to open up the seams.

End result is the planned longwall mining system cannot be followed and instead a combination of shortwall

mining and pillar extraction will be used. That will push the estimated cost of the coal up to around R40/t, which is unacceptable to Eskom.

Eskom energy manager Brian Statham comments: "We are not satisfied with the increase in cost from Majuba but we have a very good relationship with Randcoal, which is why we are working together to find a solution."

The first three generating sets at Majuba will be commissioned as planned in 1996, 1997 and 1998 but construction of the last three has been delayed by a year, pending the outcome of the study now underway by Randcoal.

Randcoal, as well as TNC and Johannesburg Consolidated Investment (JCI), own other reserves in the Majuba area which could be mined to feed the power station and these deposits are being evaluated at present.

If additional coal reserves that can be mined at a price acceptable to Eskom cannot be found around Majuba the alternative is to build the last three generating sets elsewhere.

Obvious possibility is to add them on to Kendal where the sixth and last generating set will be commissioned in 1993. Randcoal owns extensive additional coal reserves surrounding those committed to Kendal from its Khutala colliery.

Statham says if a decision is taken to complete the last three sets at Majuba there will only be a delay of one year and the power station would be fully commissioned by 2002. Should the sets be relocated elsewhere each set will be delayed by three years, pushing the final completion date out to 2004.

### Productivity, Training Goals

93AF0403H Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 22 Jan 93 pp 70-73

[Text] Coal company managements are unanimous in identifying the need for greater productivity from the workforce as the most pressing requirement for the industry to survive in the highly competitive coal export market.

"We need a much more educated workforce and we need to develop workers who are multi-skilled.

"We must have workers who can drive all the types of equipment in a workplace, not just one specific machine, and who can undertake basic maintenance on their own machines if something simple breaks down," says Randcoal chairman Allen Sealey.

In its new collieries the industry is insisting on better-qualified workers. For example, every worker at Trans-Natal Coal Corp's (TNC) new Gloria colliery has to be fluent in English, whether he works in the change house or drives a continuous miner.

However, the industry has also recognised that much has to be done to rectify the underlying deficiencies in the

system of black education which, because of the former doctrines of apartheid, have resulted in the majority of S.A.'s black pupils receiving an inferior education compared with whites.

All the major coal groups provide primary schooling for the children of their employees, often building the schools themselves at mines in remote locations or, increasingly, following the sweeping recent reforms in the country's education system, by investing in schools in established townships near their operations.

They all also provide special classes concentrating on literacy and numeracy skills for their unskilled workers. TNC, for example, has provided 42 classrooms and appointed 60 full- or part-time teachers. More than 1,100 employees have completed or are currently attending classes leading to proficiency at Std 5 level of English.

Another 150 TNC employees are attending part-time technical training courses at technikons while discussions are under way with the unions to eventually link basic literacy and numeracy education to ongoing, career-related, technical training.

Randcoal has gone one better with the formation of the Allendale Secondary School at its Duvha Colliery near Witbank, which will provide secondary education for employees' children who have already been through one of the group's seven primary schools.

Randcoal human resources executive Koos Nel stresses these schools are run in partnership with the Department of Education & Training (DET). Operating budgets are split 60:40 between the DET and Randcoal, with Randcoal paying for, among other things, extra teachers to bring the pupil-teacher ratio to 30:1 instead of the usual 45:1 in black schools.

The group has set up an education services unit, run by Andrew Taylor, which concentrates on upgrading the skills of the teachers in the various schools, particularly in the fields of mathematics and sciences.

Another innovation was to start English lessons far sooner than is normal in the government curriculum, where children are taught only in their vernacular language up to Std 3. Nel says Randcoal approached the parents of the children in all their schools to request their support to bring in English from the outset. English instruction is now run parallel with the home language from Grade 1.

"Reaction from the parents was incredible. They said that if this would improve their children's education they were all for it. They had no worries about any loss of proficiency in the mother tongue because this would be made up at home," says Nel.

Randcoal decided to set up Allendale in 1990 as a logical follow-on from the investment it was making in the primary education of its workers' children. The school started its first pupil intake in 1992.

"The structure of black secondary education was essentially flawed and you could see it in the matric results, where students were achieving passes in subjects like Bible studies but not in the other subjects needed to provide a well-rounded education like English, maths and science," says Nel.

All the group's mines, with the exception of Welgedacht and Majuba, are situated within a 20 km radius of Allendale so the children can be bussed there each day. The school maintains close contact with parents, who pay R100 a month for each of their children attending Allendale.

Allendale is unique in that it combines under one roof a technical college offering students a technical matric as well as a secondary school offering commercial stream and scientific stream education. The technical college is a satellite of the Witbank Technical College and is unusual in that it has no technical workshops—instead the students spend 21 weeks doing practicals in the mine workshops each year.

"While the emphasis is on subjects like maths and science, the aim is to produce a well-rounded student—we do not want to produce little technocrats or the kind of engineer who will destroy the environment," says Taylor.

Randcoal, obviously, has a vested interest in these pupils, but Nel stresses the group does not let its corporate culture intrude on the school.

"Yes, we would like very much to employ some of these students but we see Allendale as a social investment from an enlightened self-interest point of view. The workforce in the Witbank area is pretty stable and we feel many of these students will eventually stay and work in this general area," says Nel.

"In Germany no coal companies are involved in running schools because they don't have to, the State provides an excellent education system. That's not the case in S.A. If all the major companies in the Witbank area got involved in investing in education in a similar way I think there would be a cumulative effect from which we would all benefit," he adds.

Taylor comments: "We work very closely with the DET. We are not trying to change the system, all we are trying to do is build up the foundations so we can educate correctly and better than before.

"We are finding more and more that there's a wealth of talent in our black students but there's a confidence gap we have to bridge."

Randcoal has for years operated a bursary system to send handpicked students, who are children of group employees, to some of S.A.'s top private schools and so expose them to the best education available in the country. With the sweeping changes in S.A.'s education system and, in particular, the formation of Model C schools, the group is now diversifying that policy.

While some pupils will continue to be sent to private schools, a larger number will be sent to certain Model C schools in the Witbank area. The Model C school fees are much cheaper, meaning more pupils can benefit from exposure to alternative systems of education.

### Reserves Assessed

93AF04031 Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in  
English 22 Jan 93 pp 73-74

[Text] A striking feature of S.A.'s penetration of the international coal export trade is that it has been achieved on a resource base that is inferior to many of the country's competitors, such as Australia, Colombia and Indonesia.

S.A. steamcoal is generally, in world terms, of poor quality. It has a low calorific value, a high ash content and a low volatile matter content. However, one advantage it does have in an increasingly environmentally conscious world is a low sulphur content.

The local exporters have overcome these disadvantages through producing a washed, saleable product that is extremely consistent in both size and quality. Hand-in-hand with this reliability of product has gone a hard-earned reputation for reliability of supply through the operations of the Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT).

The geology of the coal deposits has also helped. The coal seams of the eastern Transvaal are generally shallow, geologically consistent and thick. That all makes for cheap mining and was a major reason S.A. was able to carve such a swathe through the competition following the commissioning of the RBCT in 1976. In the first 10 years of its operations the S.A. coal export trade managed a 35 per cent compound annual growth rate from 2.7 Mt to 40 Mt in 1985, which is a phenomenal achievement.

Those were the good old days and, as this survey has underlined, times have changed for the worse. Working costs have since taken off and the geology and distribution of S.A.'s remaining coal reserves hold cost implications for the long-term future of the industry.

The major coal developments to date have concentrated largely on the Witbank, Highveld and eastern Transvaal fields situated in the eastern and south-eastern Transvaal, which are the best in the country. The coal seams are relatively shallow in depth at 60 m or less, while they are thick, averaging 3 m-4m, as well as being flat-lying and largely undisturbed by faulting.

This is where the main export collieries are situated, along with the Secunda oil-from-coal plant, and also where the bulk of Eskom's power stations are located. Eskom has located power stations away from this region, such as Matimba in the Waterberg and Majuba in the south-eastern Transvaal.

Despite the low sulphur content of S.A. coal, CSIR [Council for Scientific and Industrial Research] statistics show that 60t-80t annually of sulphur dioxide per square kilometre is being pumped into the air over a region which covers the towns of Ermelo, Bethal, Secunda, Middelburg and Witbank.

The big environmental debate is over where all that sulphur dioxide lands, with Eskom claiming its high chimney stacks disperse the pollution widely and its opponents countering that the winter temperature inversions bring most of it down in the immediate area. If what goes up in this particular part of the eastern Transvaal does come down in the same area, then it rates as one of the most polluted regions in the world.

In the case of Majuba, Eskom accepted that the cost of the coal provided would be some 20 per cent higher than from other deposits offered in the Witbank area. Majuba, however, turned out to be a classic example of the problems associated with S.A.'s alternative coalfields, which have a more complex geology than the prime deposits around Witbank.

Calculations of when coal reserves on the various fields will start to run out are complicated by a number of factors, including different exploitation rates for different types of coal, market demand and supply conditions, and new mining technologies.

However, when production has to shift to other coalfields working costs are going to rise and so will transport costs to the export market.

Estimating just how much coal S.A. has and how long it will last has always been subject to controversy. In 1967 a report by the working committee of the Coal Advisory Board indicated S.A.'s coal reserves could be seriously depleted within 40-100 years because they were estimated at a mere 24bn t in situ.

That resulted in the appointment of the Petrick Commission in 1970, which duly reported in 1975 that the fears were unfounded—mineable in-situ reserves were estimated at 81.3bn t, of which 25.4bn could be extracted. Then came an evaluation by F de Jager of the Geological Survey in 1983 which boosted in-situ reserves to 121.5bn t, of which 59bn tons could be recovered.

A major difference between these two was the assessment of the Waterberg field, where De Jager calculated 50bn t of in-situ mineable bituminous coal, of which 18bn tons could be recovered—against Petrick's 17.9bn t, of which 2.4bn could be recovered.

In his 1987 president's address to the S.A. Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (SAIMM), Ben Alberts tackled the issue of this difference and came to the conclusion that much depended on the use of opencasting mining methods. He said that without opencast mining, some 21.4bn t of reserves in the Waterberg would be "sterilised."

Key points are that the Waterberg coalfield, which represents only 2.8 per cent of the area of known



coalfields in S.A., contains 46 per cent of the total in-situ resources and that low-grade bituminous reserves are the mainstay of S.A.'s saleable reserves.

Reserves of high-grade non-coking bituminous coal are a valuable portion of the reserve base because more than 80 per cent of current exports are sourced from this material. The Waterberg field contains 25 per cent of SA's high-grade non-coking coal.

Looking long-term, the Waterberg is the area which holds the greatest potential for further development as the quality of coal found in the Free State fields is typically even lower than that of the Transvaal.

So far the coalfields of the northern Transvaal are largely undeveloped, with only Iscor's Grooteegeluk Colliery in operation near Ellisras on the Waterberg field, supplying metallurgical grade coal to its steel mills as well as steamcoal to Eskom's Matimba power station.

Problems that would have to be dealt with in opening up the Waterberg include higher working costs and a shortage of water in the region, which puts constraints on the two most obvious uses for the coal—power stations and oil-from-coal plants. Also, the distance from the Waterberg to Richards Bay will push up transport costs dramatically—some observers feel to the point where exports from the field may not be viable.

(Special report written by Brendan Ryan)

## Angola

### Official on U.S. 'Ambiguities' Toward Peace Process

MB2503051693 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Text] Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Joao Miranda told ANGOP today that the U.S.-National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] meeting scheduled for Abidjan will only be meaningful if Washington persuades UNITA to desist from war and to respect the election results. With regard to the outcome of that meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Joao Miranda reaffirmed the government's position that only observance of the election results would permit the normal implementation of the peace accords.

Minister Miranda said, quote: We believe the United States has much responsibility because, in addition to having been UNITA's greatest backer during the war, it is also an observer of the Angolan peace process, unquote. He added the United States had guaranteed, shortly before the September elections, that it would do everything to ensure UNITA would not return to war, even if it lost the elections. Those promises have not only not been kept, some ambiguities have also been detected in the White House's stand toward UNITA since it resumed its war against democratic institutions.

Deputy Foreign Minister Miranda has asked the Ivorian and Moroccan Governments to try to persuade UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to accept the democratic game which has been introduced in Angola. Joao Miranda also noted the ever greater role of African mediation in Angola, but he added it would not replace the obligations of the UN Verification Mission-2 or of the observers.

### Efforts to Prompt UNITA-Government Talks Detailed

MB2403201993 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Excerpts] New contacts are under way to make possible an Angolan Government-National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] meeting. Tomorrow, the U.S. Administration is to get in touch with a UNITA negotiating team in the capital of the Cote d'Ivoire, with a view to securing guarantees from UNITA regarding UN-supervised direct talks with the government.

Jeffrey Davidow, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs [title as heard], is to head the U.S. team to the meeting with UNITA Information Secretary Jorge Valentim [words indistinct] to determine the venue of the meeting. The Angolan Government believes it should take place in an African capital, while UNITA favors an European capital. Jorge Valentim went so far as to say that his team's concrete proposals are in line with Jonas Savimbi's latest speech. He said UNITA does not believe Geneva cannot be changed as the venue of the next meeting with the government.

U.S. diplomacy is thus showing greater attention to the Angolan dossier. Even Secretary of State Warren Christopher is said to be considering the possibility of appointing a special U.S. representative in Angola. [passage omitted]

The UN Angola Verification Mission-2 [UNAVEM-2] has been trying to contact the UNITA leadership for two fundamental reasons: the establishment of dialogue with the government and the coordination of humanitarian aid in UNITA-controlled areas. What is known, though, is that such contacts have not been successful. Jonas Savimbi's organization has not been in touch with UNAVEM-2 or humanitarian organizations since 20 March, not even to allow aid to reach people in need.

Observers see UNITA's behavior as related to Jonas Savimbi's recently expressed desire to remove Margaret Anstee from her duties in Angola. Ms. Anstee's duties have increased, in that she is now responsible for coordinating humanitarian aid too.

### UNITA Reportedly Destroys Power Station in Retreat

MB2503100993 Luanda TPA Television Network in Portuguese 1930 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Text] Caxito is in the dark. No light can be seen at night. That is because the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] destroyed the Mabubas power station as it withdrew under pressure by government forces.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] The Mabubas power station supplied electricity to Caxito, the Dembos region and a section of the city of Luanda. The power station had been reopened on 24 September 1992 after the completion of nearly seven years of reconstruction works to the tune of over \$10 million. Today, the power station lies idle only because UNITA, in line with its economic destabilization policy, did not spare the Mabubas power station.

[National Electricity Enterprise worker Pedro Domingos] They began by [words indistinct] the sluice gates, half of which are broken so much so that water is flowing over the wall. They destroyed all of the station's winches, the pipes leading to the sluice gates [words indistinct] and then went to the power station itself where they burned it to the ground. They burned the station's three transformers beyond repair. The substation was completely destroyed. They destroyed the section underneath the turbines and right now we do not know whether the area has been mined or not.

[Reporter] Engineer Jose Madaleno, the power station's technical director, says it is imperative to find alternative sources of energy because the repair works will take at least five years and cost millions of dollars.

[Madaleno] An alternative will be for the Bengo Provincial government to buy a diesel generator unit to supply the city of Caxito. Power will not flow from this station

neither today nor tomorrow. It may take five years to repair the power station and the dam.

[Reporter] When will the repair works begin?

[Madaleno] I cannot give you a date. Next week we will assess the whole situation to see if it is possible to open the sluice gates. The priority now is to open the sluice gates to reduce the water level. [end recording]

### **'Violent Clashes' Take Place in Bie**

*MB2403192193 Jamba Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro in Portuguese 1900 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] Violent clashes taking place in the city of Bie [words indistinct] disclosed by the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola [FALA] General Staff [words indistinct] strategic points in the city, namely Bie's infamous Comarca jail. Over the last 24 hours, the glorious FALA forces acted in strictly defensive terms to [words indistinct] and occupy major positions of the joint People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola [FAPLA]-Angolan Armed Forces [FAA]-Riot Police [Policia Antimotim] at (Pena), Cangalo, (Perpeco), and [word indistinct] Wards as well as Bie's infamous Comarca jail.

In those violent clashes [words indistinct] the enemy has suffered countless troops killed and wounded, including Captain (Macedo) [words indistinct] in their hasty flight, the FAPLA-FAA- Riot Police forces left behind the following war materiel: two long range cannons, [words indistinct] six 89mm mortars, two 60mm mortars, (?two) RPG-7 rocket launchers [words indistinct], large quantities of weapons. [passage indistinct]

### **France To Assist in Coastal Patrol Operations**

*MB2503100893 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Excerpt] Angola could within the next two years see a solution to the problem of patrolling its maritime coast. To this end, the Fisheries Ministry and France recently signed a financial accord worth about 40 million francs for the supply of vessels, technical assistance and training of cadres. Fisheries Minister Fatima Jardim said the project also involves defense and security agencies as a means of strictly applying the law to those who use the Angolan coastal waters. [passage omitted]

## **Malawi**

### **Justice Minister Resigns for 'Personal Reasons'**

*MB2403170893 Blantyre Malawi Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 1600 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] His Excellency the life president, Ngwazi [Paramount] Dr. Kamuzu Banda, has accepted the resignation of Mr. Friday Makuta as minister of justice. An announcement from the Office of the President and

Cabinet in Lilongwe said today that the resignation of Mr. Makuta for personal reasons is with effect from 18th March 1993.

### **Government 'Interference' Cited**

*MB2503094793 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0400 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Malawian Justice Minister Mr. Friday Makuta has resigned from his post allegedly for disagreeing with the Malawi Government's interference in the country's legal affairs. That was revealed by Malawian judicial sources and opposition politicians in a telephone interview with REUTERS in Johannesburg. They, however, did not say when the minister resigned.

The sources believe that the minister disagreed with the authorities over the trial of Chakufwa Chihana, the trade unionist leader and pro-democracy activist who was sentenced to two years in prisons in December 1992. REUTERS cited a communique issued by the Alliance for Democracy, Aford, as saying that two weeks ago, Makuta was forced to ban two opposition newspapers, namely the Aford newspaper and the United Democratic Front's UDF NEWS.

## **Mozambique**

### **Renamo Refuses To Send Troops for Training in Nyanga**

*MB2503101393 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 0600 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] soldiers will only accept UN training of the new Mozambican army when all of the country's forces have been demobilized. That was stated by a Renamo spokesman who stressed that his organization refuses to send 50 of its men to the British military training camp at Nyanga, eastern Zimbabwe.

According to Aldo Ajello, UN special representative, training at Nyanga was scheduled to begin before the end of March. Ajello had said that Renamo was selecting 50 of its men to undergo training at Nyanga. The other 50 men will be drawn from the government armed forces.

### **Renamo Reportedly Sets Up Police Force in Zambezia**

*MB2403123193 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1030 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] Our Zambezia correspondent reports that the Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] is creating a police force in areas it controls. Eyewitnesses told our correspondent that they saw armed men in Renamo areas, but who are regarded as policemen. The creation of a Renamo police force could complicate the already difficult Mozambican peace process. Once the time comes to encamp the armed forces, there could be



allegations that that police force is designed to maintain law and order in areas controlled by Afonso Dhlakama's movement.

It is known that Renamo is seeking to hastily set up its own administration by appointing administrators and secretaries, namely for health, agriculture and trade.

Meanwhile, Renamo is apparently trying to flood its areas with assorted produce like corn and beans although it controls highly productive areas, namely Namanjavira and (Muaquia) in Mocuba District, the most productive areas north of Morrumbala and south of Milange where it is thought Alfazema Base, Renamo's largest base in Zambezia Province, is situated. Renamo also controls Nintulo and Gurue on the border between Zambezia and Nampula Provinces, and (Maquiringa), the northern Namarroi region, (Lichia), an extremely fertile area in Alto Molocue District, and Mocubela in Pebane District.

A source with a nongovernmental organization told us it is difficult to understand Renamo's claim that people in its areas are starving while it controls highly productive areas, particularly in a year with good rains and where crop prospects are good.

Our source acknowledged, however, that Renamo needs clothing, salt, soap, hoes, blankets and medicine to treat diseases like measles, scabies and diarrhea.

In Zambezia Province, the peace process is not yet on track because mistrust still prevails. While senior Renamo officials tour government-controlled areas and meet its representatives, Renamo is still refusing to allow government members to visit its areas. The situation has worsened with the reported movements by Renamo combatants which make the residents fear a resumption of the armed conflict in Mozambique.

It is, therefore, worth asking: What is Renamo hiding?

#### **Chissano Receives Senegal Foreign Minister 23 Mar**

*MB2303182393 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1730 GMT 23 Mar 93*

[Text] President of the Republic Joaquim Chissano today granted an audience to visiting Senegalese Foreign Affairs Minister Djibo Laity Ka, Senegal President Abdou Diouf's special envoy. Abdou Diouf is also acting OAU chairman.

#### **Botswana's Mogae Arrives With Message for Chissano**

*MB2403120093 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1430 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] Botswana Vice President Festus Mogae arrived in Maputo today. He is carrying a message from Botswana

President Quett Masire to Joaquim Chissano, his Mozambican counterpart. Mogae is touring southern African countries in his capacity as presidential envoy. From Mozambique, Mogae will leave for Tanzania. He is also scheduled to visit Uganda.

#### **Police Collect Firearms Issued to Militiamen, Others**

*MB2503101093 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0400 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] The Mozambican police have already completed the first phase of the campaign for the collection of firearms that were issued to the People's Militia command posts and other agencies during the war. Gabriel Vicente, commander of the city of Maputo's Protection Police, told the MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION AGENCY that the second phase of the campaign is under way at enterprises and economic projects which were also issued with weapons to protect their infrastructures from Mozambique National Resistance attacks.

He added that the third phase of the campaign will include firearms in possession of individuals. Some individuals were authorized to carry firearms for self-defense. Gabriel Vicente added that Maputo's militiamen who are still armed, come under the direct control of the police and that their firearms are issued by the city's police command.

### **Namibia**

#### **Foreign Minister Dismisses UNITA Claims on Cuban Forces**

*MB2503123693 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0321 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Windhoek March 24 SAPA—Foreign Affairs Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab has dismissed UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] leader Jonas Savimbi's claims that 2,000 Cuban troops have landed at Luderitz and are being transported north to fight against his rebel movement in Angola. "We do not only have political problems with Mr Savimbi, but quite clearly there is something wrong with his mental state...." Mr Gurirab told NAMBC [Namibian Broadcasting Corporation] TV on Wednesday night. Speaking from Washington, where he has been holding talks with senior American officials regarding UNITA threats against Namibia, Mr Gurirab said these claims, which were broadcast by UNITA's radio Vorgan and the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation], were not true. He said Namibia was a free country and both local and international media and foreign diplomats could not have failed to detect a landing of thousands of soldiers if it had been a reality.

**Weak Economy Blamed on Global Recession, Drought**

MB2503140293 Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 18 Mar 93 pp 10, 11

[Unattributed report: "Economy Under Pressure"—From the "Independence Day Supplement"]

[Excerpts] Since independence in 1990 the Namibian economy has been characterized by strong growth and an annual rise in the Gross National Product.

The country's economy in the period after independence has, however, bent under the pressure of the same suppressive factors affecting neighboring countries as well as countries in the rest of southern Africa, of which the serious drought and worldwide economic recession are the main culprits.

The Namibian economy centers mainly on mining, responsible for 75 percent of the country's total exports, nearly half of the country's Gross National Product, more than 50 percent of all state income and which provided for altogether 11,441 jobs by the end of December.

The most important economic leg alongside the mining sector is commercial agriculture, providing, at the moment, work to approximately 36,000 people, in turn ensuring a livelihood for approximately 320,000 people. Approximately 75 percent of the country's total population are dependent on agriculture for their continued existence, mainly through subsistence farming practices.

The Namibian fishing industry actually has the biggest growth potential and, according to UN predictions, it could deliver approximately 1,000 million rands to the economic sector towards the end of the decade, through the granting of fishing licenses, job opportunities and foreign sales.

Independence has allowed Namibia, for the first time, to introduce effective control measures for the country's coastal waters, which houses one of the world's richest fishing fields, through the proclamation of an Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles which enjoys international recognition, unlike the situation that prevailed during the pre-independence era.

The most critical problem facing the local economy, at the moment, is unemployment. A serious dispute exists at present on the role of the state and the duties of the private sector on the creation of jobs and job opportunities in the country, thereby encouraging economic growth.

Approximately 40 percent of the total labor force of approximately 600,000 economically active persons in the country are unemployed at the moment. In certain communities the unemployment figure is significantly higher.

Since independence the situation, in terms of available job opportunities, has not improved much but has indicated a negative trend along with the general global

economic decline. It is especially the mining sector that has been hard hit by large-scale cutbacks. In 1980 19,776 workers were employed at the main mines in the country. The figure has gradually decreased to the lowest level of 11,232 in 1991.

Rossing Uranium, the world's largest open cast uranium mine, had drastically reduced activities by the end of 1991 because of poor international prices for uranium oxide, which led to a 25 percent reduction in the labor force at the mine.

For the past decade the mining sector has been placed under intense pressure because of the economic recession worldwide.

State and political independence for Namibia has come at a crucial period in world history, the era of democracy accompanied by the market related economic system, regarded as the best and only option for a workable economic organization. [passage omitted]

Setbacks in the mining industry during the independence period continued during 1991 and 1992 and no noteworthy changes are expected in 1993, rather a continuation in the weakening pattern in, among other things, trade in basic metals. A typical example is the diamond mining sector as the most important sub-sector of the country's mining industry. In 1990-91 diamond mines contributed 62.2 million to state coffers, and in the same year increased its production to 1.5 million carats, representing a doubling in production, compared to 1990. The sale of diamonds through the international organization, the Central Sales Organization, stood at approximately 10.2 billion last year, indicating a loss of 1,530 million rands or 13 percent, compared to the sales figures the year before.

The 1992 sales figures are the fourth consecutive poor year in the diamond industry, since the highest level achieved in 1988. [passage omitted]

Last year Rossing Uranium produced a total of 2,190 tonnes of uranium oxide compared to the 3,185 tonnes in 1991. Production levels for 1993 will, according to all indications, remain unchanged, this means that at the moment the country is delivering just less than half of its full potential.

Copper production in Namibia increased last year compared to 1991. Total production of blister copper in 1992 stood at 34,451 tonnes compared to 32,929 tonnes in 1991. The production of lead, on the other hand, has shown a decline from 33,367 tonnes in 1991 to 31,655 tonnes in 1992. Last year zinc production increased from 33,150 tonnes in 1991 to 36,000 tonnes in 1992.

In respect to the production of precious metals, Namibia produced 72 tonnes of silver and 2,009 kilograms of gold last year.

The total revenue from gold production stood at 60 million rands in 1992.

Despite the global economic recession that has seriously affected the world's most important mines, Namibia has experienced an increase in prospecting since independence.

Altogether 41 applications for exclusive prospecting licenses were handed in to the government compared to approximately 30 the previous year. [Passage omitted]

### Swaziland

#### King Mswati Appoints Chief Electoral Officer

MB2303133393 Mbabane *THE TIMES OF SWAZILAND* in English 23 Mar 93 pp 1, 32

[Report by Gordon Mbuli: "Thwala is Chief Electoral Officer"]

[Text] A Chief Electoral Officer to supervise the elections has been named.

He is Mr Robert Thwala, a retired Chief Immigrations Officer in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Mr Thwala has been appointed by His Majesty King Mswati III.

The King has also appointed former Principal Secretary for Tinkhundla [traditional community councils], Mr Robert Mdluli, now PS [principal secretary] for Home Affairs to be the deputy Chief Electoral Officer.

The Principal Secretary for Tinkhundla, Mr Enos Mavuso confirmed the appointment of the two.

The officers are expected to start work immediately.

The first action which Mr Thwala is expected to do is to issue a notice calling upon all Swazis to register as voters.

They will elect MPs for the House of Assembly. A staff to work with them is expected to be announced soon, from government ministries and departments.

The King is also to announce a Delimitation Commission which will be the last commission before the elections. The commission is to investigate the adequacy and accessibility of the existing Tinkhundla for purposes of elections, meetings and other purposes, provided that if the need arises, the number of Tinkhundla centres may be increased.

### Zambia

#### EC Grants Aid to Export Program; U.S. Writes Off Debt

MB2503120793 Johannesburg *SAPA* in English 1010 GMT 25 Mar 93

[Text] Lusaka Mar 25 *SAPA*—Zambia has been given a grant of 5.2 million kwacha [K] for its export development programme by the European Community, and the United States Government has written off a debt of K59

billion. EC Commission head Dr Nikolas Alexandrakis said in Lusaka on Thursday [25 March] that the funds would encourage diversification of export earnings.

"With this grant, we are trying to increase non-traditional exports and to reduce the dependency on earnings from the traditional (copper) sector," Dr Alexandrakis said. Credit would be made available to emerging and established producers and growers exporting proven goods to promising markets. "The idea is to double the current foreign exchange earnings from potential export sectors from 40 million US dollars to 80 million US dollars a year by 1995," Dr Alexandrakis said.

Finance Minister Emmanuel Kasonde announced on Wednesday that the US had written off K59 billion of Zambia's debt. A further K28 billion would be cancelled if Zambia complied with the rights accumulation programme, and K34.7 billion of the debt would be rescheduled for payment by October 2018.

### Zimbabwe

#### Government, UN Sign Refugee Repatriation Accord

MB2403123893 Maputo *Radio Mozambique Network* in Portuguese 1030 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Text] The Zimbabwe Government has undertaken to facilitate the repatriation of some 140,000 Mozambican refugees from that country. This was disclosed to our correspondent today by John Nkomo, Zimbabwe's public service, labor and social welfare minister, who has signed an agreement with the Mozambican Government and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR].

Under the terms of the agreement, Zimbabwe will arrange for the transfer of assets belonging to Mozambican refugees. He said that the repatriation of the refugees will depend on conditions to be created by the UNHCR.

#### ADB Funds \$45 Million Water, Telecommunications Projects

MB2403095493 Harare *THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE* in English 18 Mar 93 p 10

[Unattributed report: "ADB To Provide US\$45 Million For Projects"]

[Text] The African Development Bank (ADB) will this year provide about US\$8 million for a water feasibility study and a further US\$37 million for the Posts and Telecommunications digitalisation programme.

The bank's principal finance officer, Ms Willye King said this week the ADB board of governors approved



US\$8.3 million for a feasibility study to establish a new source of water for the city of Harare in December last year.

A Zimbabwe government delegation is expected to go to Abidjan, Ivory Coast [Cote d'Ivoire] later this month to sign the agreement. The agreement was supposed to have been signed at the beginning of this month.

Ms King said the Harare City Council was already implementing some aspects of the study. The study is meant to establish a new water source for Harare using the rivers to the east of the city as a catchment area with new dam and water purification works similar to those at Morton Jaffray Water Works.

The first part of the study will be executed by the Department of Water Development and will review three to four possible dam sites in the Upper Nyangani catchment and then select the best one to meet the city's demand.

On the digitalisation programme, Ms King said an appraisal of the project had been completed and negotiations would soon be held with the government. The ADB first assisted the PTC's [Posts and Telecommunications Corporation] digitalisation programme in 1983 when it provided about US\$9 million.

#### **ZESA Increases Electrical Power Intake From S. Africa**

*MB2403095693 Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 18 Mar 93 p 8*

[Unattributed report: "ZESA Steps Up Power Intake From SA"]

[Text] The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority [ZESA] has stepped up its intake of electrical power from

South Africa from 12 mega watts [mw] to 20 mega watts in order to boost local supplies, an official with the authority has said.

ZESA's public relations manager, Mr. Isidore Mazarura said this was part of a joint move with South Africa to integrate regional electricity supply.

"We believe that a regionally integrated network is the most sensible thing to do now," he added.

The Messina-Beitbridge line had been upgraded and would soon be able to handle about 40 MW of power. The proposed Matimba-Bulawayo line had also been approved by both parties and work was currently under way on a feasibility study which would be done jointly by the South African Power authority, Eskom [Electricity Supply Commission] and ZESA.

However, plans to import a further 60MW to 100MW of South African power through the Botswana Power Corporation had been stopped. "The Botswana project is one that requires no immediate attention because of its intrinsic problem of synchronisation of the three systems (RSA [Republic of South Africa], Botswana, and Zimbabwe)", Mr Mazarura said.

The tripartite agreement signed last year between Zesa, Snel [Societe' Nationale d'Electricite'] (Zaire), and Zesco [Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation] (Zambia) would allow Zimbabwe to continue importing nearly 120 MW from Zaire.

The levels of power imported from Zambia would remain unchanged and with the good rains, the supplies were expected to improve.

"Although at the moment there is a lot of emphasis on developing regional interconnection, we would like the public to remember that ZESA takes serious cognisance of the need for self-sufficiency," he said.

## Benin

### Foreign Minister Comments on Togolese Issue

AB2403184193 Cotonou Office de Radiodiffusion-  
Television du Benin Radio in French 1930 GMT  
23 Mar 93

[Text] Mr. Theodore Holo, the minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, held a news conference in Cotonou on 23 March. He wanted to clarify matters on the Beninese Government's stance following the Togolese opposition's election of Jean-Lucien Savi de Tove in Cotonou as the candidate to be recommended to the High Council of the Republic [HCR] for the post of prime minister. This decision received local and international reaction.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] In an explanatory introduction, Mr. Holo pointed out the steps taken by the Beninese Government to help the Togolese find a solution to their democratic process. He referred in particular to the steps which encouraged HCR chairman, Monsignor Kpodzro, to return to Togo following the tragic December incidents. He also referred to the steps which initiated dialogue among the various organs in Togo such as the HCR, the government, and the head of state.

Mr. Holo was later interviewed by reporters, who wanted to know the Beninese Government's stance on the Togolese opposition's decision. They also wished to know if Benin had become an asylum for a government formed by the Togolese opposition. In other words, they wanted to know if the decision made by the Togolese opposition was in line with international regulations on refugees. Here is an excerpt of Mr. Holo's reply:

[Holo] Steps taken by Benin up until now have basically been to facilitate dialogue among the different Togolese political groups. Benin will not interfere in the domestic affairs of any country or tell any country what to do. We maintain that others may learn from our democratic experience if they wish to do so, and if it is in line with their disposition and culture. However, we do not wish to tell countries what to do.

We also hope that our leaders holding the Economic Community of West African States chairmanship will not be indifferent to what is happening in neighboring countries. The main point is to prevent what is happening in Liberia from happening in our country. Benin is a country where peace and freedom prevail. I think that political asylum is part of United Nations international regulations. It has been endorsed by regional institutions such as the OAU. It is, therefore, our duty, whenever necessary, to show hospitality to whoever requests it on condition that those to whom we show hospitality respect our country's neutrality and the existing regulations.

[Unidentified reporter] The reporters appeared unconvinced. Two people from a foreign mission were also at the conference. This made some reporters wonder if a foreign power had influenced the Beninese Government

to react the way it did. Mr. Holo said that was not the case. Benin has been a sovereign country since 1 August 1960 and is recognized as such by the international community. It, therefore, does not receive orders from any country.

Regarding the reaction of certain Togolese presidential groups which advocate severing diplomatic ties with Benin, Mr. Holo indicated that such a move would be in no one's interest. He said the historical and geographical ties between the two countries compel them to live in perfect harmony. Mr. Holo also met the diplomatic corps in Benin. He stressed that Benin maintains a policy of neutrality as far as the Togolese crisis is concerned. He went on to say that the fact that there are Togolese refugees in Benin is a sign of African and Beninese hospitality. [end recording]

## Cote d'Ivoire

### Politician Calls For Executive-Legislative Unity

AB2303163293 Abidjan FRATERNITE MATIN in  
French 22-23 Mar 93 p 6

[Article by Salif Diaby: "Economic and Social Council—Mr. Yace Recommends Solidarity and Unity of Action"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] As one of Cote d'Ivoire's most experienced politicians, Mr. Philippe Yace, president of the Social and Economic Council [CES], could not remain apathetic to the stirring which has been going on within the Ivorian political class for some time now. Yace's age and the fact that he has played a key role in the high-level management of this country's affairs were both in his favor. On the strength of this double advantage, Mr. Yace had to play the "card of appeasement" between Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara and National Assembly speaker Henri Konan Bedie.

And this was precisely what he did on 19 March at the formal opening of this year's first session of the CES. Among Mr. Yace's guests at the front were Mr. Alassane Ouattara, who was representing the president of the Republic, and Mr. Henri Konan Bedie, sitting right beside him. Also attending the ceremony were Supreme Court President Lazenie Coulibaly, government members, and representatives of the diplomatic corps led by the Apostolic Nuncio.

One does not fight at the bedside of an ailing mother, the saying goes. This is why Mr. Yace preached unity of action between the executive and the legislature and, moreover, solidarity among the country's sons, despite the differences in political standpoints. The main objective is to arrive at "a kind of social pact to save Cote d'Ivoire." [passage omitted]

According to the CES president, "all state institutions, all the executive organs, and all the social forces must focus on producing a creative energy." [passage omitted]

Concerning the issue of relations between the government and the National Assembly, President Yace concluded by saying: "It is by striving for unity of action and pooling our energies together that we can effectively build this country."

### Guinea-Bissau

#### Army Spokesman Confirms 17 Mar Coup Attempt

AB2403222793 London BBC World Service in English  
1830 GMT 24 Mar 93

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] The Government of Guinea-Bissau has apparently changed its mind over the incident a week ago when the commander of an elite military unit was assassinated. It led to much speculation that it was a part of a coup plot against the government of President Vieira. The authorities said it wasn't, but last night, the military came clean, as Joao Quintino reports in this telex from Bissau:

Army spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Afonso Taye, appeared on television last night to confirm what military sources had already disclosed in private, that there had indeed been an attempted coup on the night of 17th March during the course of which, Major Robalo de Pino, commander of the Elite Rapid Intervention Force, had been killed.

Four people, including the leader of the alleged plot, Brigadier Mario Suarez, a former political commissary in the Navy, are now being held at the main army barracks in Bissau in connection with the conspiracy. Over there it is believed that as many as 50 soldiers, including three captains and a lieutenant, may have been involved.

Journalists were allowed to question those in custody last night. One prisoner, Brahim Assane, said the conspirators had planned to install a militant of the ruling PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] party as president and to take the jobs of defense and national security ministers for themselves.

According to the same source, certain opposition parties were also involved in the conspiracy but the military authorities have neither confirmed nor denied this.

Another said there had been a plan to assassinate President Vieira and other senior military officers. However, one of the alleged plotters, pointing a finger at those in charge of his interrogation, told me: You know very well the conditions in which we are living. This is the third attempt by the military to topple President Joao Bernardo Vieira, who himself came to power following a military coup 12 years ago. The first, in March 1984, was orchestrated by his prime minister, Vitor Saude Maria. The second in October 1986, by his vice president, Paulo Correia.

### Liberia

#### Taylor Protests UK Aid to ECOMOG Force

AB2403133693 Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English 1900  
GMT 23 Mar 93

[Text] The NPRA [National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly] government is protesting the undiplomatic behavior of the British Government in supplying ECOMOG with drugs and other medical facilities. President Taylor said the action of the British Government in supplying ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] with medical equipment when they are bombing and killing Liberians is unfriendly. The president said he has intelligence reports that the drugs were provided through the British ambassador based in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to the ECOMOG High Command.

#### NPRA Says Waritay Report on Taylor 'Baseless'

AB2403125093 Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English 1900  
GMT 23 Mar 93

[Text] The NPRA [National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly] government has described as baseless and unfounded a report concocted by the Monrovia information spokesman, Lamini Waritay, and filed to CNN World Report that Gbarnga had been captured and that President Taylor had been injured in the leg in an attack on his convoy and was presently receiving treatment in the Ivory Coast [Cote d'Ivoire]. The NPRA government said the report has no foundation whatsoever and expressed shock that the BBC Network Africa producer, Hilton Fyle, could cable such a report to CNN World Report directly from Lamini Waritay, who is Amos Sawyer's propaganda instrument. The report says Hilton Fyle has put his credibility on the line by taking a story from Lamini Waritay, who is not a reporter, to the effect that President Taylor is trapped and was calling for a cease-fire and ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] rescue. The report revealed that BBC's Hilton Fyle has a standing contract with the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service to which Lamini Waritay has filed the report. It is this report which Hilton Fyle directly communicated to the CNN World Report through his middle contact point, the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service, which has not operated a television station for more than 10 years now in Freetown through a bogus arrangement. [sentence as heard] Reports say this action on the part of Hilton Fyle is a gross deception and contrary to journalistic ethics which puts his credibility as a journalist on the line.

#### ULIMO Reportedly Carries Out Mass Executions

AB2403185093 Paris AFP in English 1837 GMT  
24 Mar 93

[Text] Monrovia, March 24 (AFP)—One of Liberia's armed factions has been carrying out mass summary



executions in recent weeks, killing nearly 30 civilians, travellers from the affected regions reported here Wednesday [24 March].

They said 14 young men were killed early this month by the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) at Zorzor, in Lofa county 220 kilometres (135 miles) north of Monrovia. Because of their tribal affiliation, they were accused of working with the main rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which lost Lofa county to ULIMO last month after holding it since 1990.

The witnesses said ULIMO had set fire to seven localities in the region.

In another incident 80 kilometres (50 miles) from here, 13 civilians were shot dead at Haindi for the same reasons. A ULIMO member in Monrovia told AFP they were executed for causing the death of a ULIMO fighter.

The sources said ULIMO had set up a "court" in neighbouring Guinea at Macenta about 20 kilometres (12 miles) from the border north of Voinjama, 260 kilometres (160 miles) from Monrovia.

They said the court was presided over by General Alfred Gayflor, chairman of the military tribunal which sat during the rule of president Samuel Doe, who was assassinated by NPFL renegades in November 1990.

All men from Lofa seeking refuge in Guinea were brought before the court and most were sentenced to death, the witnesses said.

Their accounts corroborated earlier reports from forest workers and humanitarian agency staff that ULIMO was getting full cooperation from Guinean security forces.

#### **President Sawyer Urges ULIMO-ECOMOG Cooperation**

*AB2403124093 Monrovia Radio ELBC in English 0900 GMT 23 Mar 93*

[Text] The Interim Government of National Unity says it will not compromise the security of Liberians to satisfy any warring faction and has, therefore, called on ULIMO [United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia] to fully cooperate with ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] in implementing the relevant peace accords on Liberia. Interim President Amos Sawyer, addressing journalists during a news conference at the Executive Mansion on Monday [22 March], said while the government continues to experience a heart of accommodation to all warring factions for the resolution of the Liberian conflict, it will not tolerate anything that poses obstacles to the democratic process.

The president said though ULIMO has indicated its willingness to comply with ECOMOG in the implementation of the Yamoussoukro peace accords, there are

some crucial issues the movement must agree to cooperate on. He said these issues, relating to the wellbeing of the people, especially distribution of health and educational facilities, the constitution of courts, as well as the establishment of an economy linked to the national economy, must be the paramount concern of ULIMO. President Amos Sawyer said the Interim Government will not accept any makeshift arrangement of substandard schools and health posts and said ULIMO must appreciate that the act of liberation only takes place by the people themselves.

He spoke of the 24,000 displaced people at the VOA center [not further identified], in Greenville, outside Monrovia, as well as Liberians currently living along the Sierra Leonean border and said ULIMO must ensure that these people return home before the rainy season.

#### **Togo**

##### **'Opposition Forces' Attack RIT Camp; Eyadema 'Safe'**

*AB2503065093 Paris AFP in English 0625 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Lome, March 25 (AFP)—Opposition forces said early Thursday [25 March] that they attacked President Gnassingbe Eyadema's military headquarters here overnight but authorities said that the head of state was not hurt and the situation was brought under control.

The Togolese opposition clandestine radio said "elements of democratic forces have launched an attack on the RIT (Togolese Interarms Regiment) camp to seize the dictator", an apparent reference to Eyadema, who has ruled this West African nation for 26 years.

The radio urged soldiers to "disobey the chief who has sullied the name of the army" and "not to let the dictator get away". It called on the population to stay home.

An officer at Lome's main military base contacted by phone confirmed that the Togolese RIT based there had been "attacked" but said the situation was "now under control".

He said an Eyadema aide had told him that the president was safe.

Heavy gunfire punctuated by explosions was heard from the direction of the camp and lasted until 5 a.m. (0500 GMT).

[In an earlier report at 0513 GMT, Paris AFP in English adds: "More than an hour before the 04:45 GMT announcement, sustained gunfire punctuated by explosions was heard from the direction of the camp. The gunfire lasted about half an hour."]

The opposition has never before mentioned the existence of these "democratic forces". Clandestine Radio-Liberte has been broadcasting since the start last November 16 of a general strike led by opponents of the Eyadema regime.

The government claims the radio is based in Ghana which adjoins Lome. About 250,000 residents of the capital including most leaders of the opposition have fled to Ghana or Benin since February following bloody repression of anti-government demonstrations.

### **Radio Said Targeted, Undamaged**

*AB2503100093 Lome Radio Lome in French 0900 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Following last night's shooting in Lome, the situation is again calm, and traffic has resumed in the capital. The shooting occurred shortly before dawn. Armed foreign forces had tried to attack the Togolese Interarms Regiment. The offices of the radio station were also targeted when a grenade thrown by the assailants fell within the station's premises, but the grenade did not cause any damage.

Meanwhile, taxicabs, vehicles, cyclists, and pedestrians who were avoiding the streets have resumed their activities, and traffic has returned to normal.

[Cotonou Office de Radiodiffusion-Television du Benin Radio in French at 0615 on 25 March also reported on today's incidents in Lome, adding: "The Togolese opposition's clandestine radio reported today at 0445 local and GMT time that the democratic forces had launched an attack against the Togolese Interarms Regiment, RIT, where the head of state, General Gnassingbe Eyadema lives." Cotonou then says: "According to the radio—the programs of which were jammed shortly after the broadcast of the message—elements of the democratic forces had launched an attack against the RIT camp to arrest the dictator."]

### **Eyadema's Chief of Staff Killed**

*AB2503124593 Paris AFP in French 1122 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Lome, 25 Mar (AFP)—General Mawulikplimi Ameji is the officer who was killed early this morning during the attack against the Togolese Interarms Regiment (RIT) in Lome where the official residence of President Gnassingbe Eyadema is located, sources close to the Presidency have announced. He was the president's private chief of staff.

The sources also stated that two of the assailants have been arrested. An official statement published earlier also indicated that one soldier was also wounded during the attack.

[Paris AFP in French at 1101 GMT on 25 March adds the following about the communique: "The statement blames the early morning attack on 'commandos from abroad armed with heavy weapons, including rocket launchers.' It states that after being 'put to flight,' the aggressors withdrew 'toward the Ghana border,' which borders Lome. The communique believes that this attack 'is aimed at sowing fear and panic' among the people and at countering the resumption of work since last week,

more than four months after the opposition launched a general and indefinite strike." The document concludes by saying that an inquiry has been opened to 'shed light on this external aggression.'" AFP adds: "According to eyewitnesses, the assailants arrived via the lagoon bordering the southern facade of the RIT camp housing the official residence of the head of state."]

### **Spokesman: Attack 'Launched From Ghana'**

*AB2503114793 Lagos Voice of Nigeria in English 1030 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In its account of the attack on the Army camp [in Lome], Togolese state radio said that foreign forces were responsible. Later, a spokesman for President Eyadema said in Paris, France, that the attack had been launched from Ghana. The Ghanaian Government is yet to react to the accusation.

### **Border Closed With Ghana**

*AB2503135093 Ouagadougou Radiodiffusion Nationale du Burkina Radio in French 1300 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Togolese national radio blamed the attempt to destabilize the Eyadema region on foreign forces.

The opposition's clandestine radio, Radio Liberte, asserted that this operation was the work of democratic forces and that it was aimed at arresting the dictator, according to the wording of its message. But the opposition rejected the accusations leveled against it in this attack. Leopold Gnininvi, leader of the Collective of Democratic Opposition [COD]-II, declared that the opposition was in no way connected with this attack.

According to the latest reports, we understand that the border with Ghana has just been closed.

### **Natchaba on Prime Ministers, 'Plot' Against Togo**

*AB2403170293 London BBC World Service in English 1705 GMT 23 Mar 93*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Togo seems to have too many prime ministers. Yesterday a meeting of Togolese opposition politicians in next door Benin nominated Jean-Lucien Savi de Tove to be the new prime minister, but there already is a prime minister, Kokou Koffigoh, who was originally nominated by the opposition though they now accuse him of siding with President Eyadema. So what does Togo's government make of the nomination of Mr. Savi de Tove? On the line to Lome, Robin White asked foreign minister, Ouattara Natchaba, what he thought.

[Begin recording] [Natchaba] First of all, I think that this nomination is [an] illegal nomination, [it] is void. The president of the Republic, General Eyadema, who is elected by the people, is the only legitimate authority entitled to nominate a new prime minister. So, the nomination of second prime minister by opposition is quite illegal.

[White] So, if Mr. Savi de Tove was to come back to Togo, would you have him arrested?

[Natchaba] No, there is no problem, if Savi de Tove wants to come back, he will be welcome. Gen. Eyadema or the prime minister himself, we are open to the dialogue with the opposition.

[White] But if Mr. Savi de Tove was to come back to Lome and march up to the prime minister's office and say: Excuse me, move over, this is my office. What will happen then?

[Natchaba] No, himself [as heard], himself cannot say that! He knows very well that he cannot say that, he never say that because he himself knows that he is not prime minister and the only authority who can give him this title is Gen. Eyadema [sentence as heard].

[White] Now, does it worry you that the Beninois authorities allowed this conference to happen on their soil?

[Natchaba] You know, Benin and Togo, we belong to ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African

States] and the president of Benin is the president of ECOWAS. I can say no comment about this.

[White] So, you are a little angry that they allowed this conference to take place in Benin.

[Natchaba] Oh, that is for Togo, that is no problem. If they allow the opposition to do, to meet to do what they want, it is only they have to appreciate [sentence as heard]. But we say the problem of Togo must be solved in Togo. If there is any neighbor country, or regional country who want to help Togo, we appreciate this help highly, but we think that Togolese must solve their problem before [receiving the] help of the neighbors.

[White] I am wondering if you might be feeling that your neighbors are plotting against you because relations with Ghana aren't very good either, are they?

[Natchaba] No, I don't think that there is any plot. But if there is a plot, we don't know that there is any plot and the only thing we know, we know that the opposition held meeting in Cotonou. So, we take in consideration only this meeting, and we cannot say that there is any plot against Togo. It is not our position. [end recording]



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